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Abstract
The forthcoming generation of mobile communication systems is widely perceived as a
convergence platform, which encompasses both multiple heterogeneous wireless access
technologies and diverse cooperative networking paradigms. Great efforts have been de-
voted to build flexible architecture capable of managing them as a whole.
Meanwhile, wireless user devices become more intelligent. They not only partici-
pate in the resource allocation process by feeding back their channel states, but also can
choose to contribute to the resource provision process by forwarding data for each other.
Opportunities bring new challenges. As mobile devices become smarter, a rational user
can adapt its behavior in order to benefit more from the network, even if doing so may
affect other users and the system’s overall performance.
Thus, the design of resource management schemes for this new era of mobile com-
munication should explore the cooperation possibility among heterogeneous wireless net-
works and their users, while taking the selfish nature of users and their strategic interac-
tions into consideration. This thesis studies the problem of how to deliver Internet access
service cooperatively to (selfish) users using heterogeneous wireless networks, in an effi-
cient, fair, and incentive-compatible manner.
Firstly, this thesis addresses the coordinated radio resource allocation problem for
users that are simultaneously covered by multiple overlapping heterogeneous wireless
networks. We propose the coordinated proportional fairness (CPF) criterion, based on
which a globally fair and efficient allocation decision can be easily computed. As CPF
decision depends on the input from users, a selfish user may manipulate its channel state
report if doing so can increase its gain from the network. We prove that CPF allocation
is incentive compatible, i.e., a user’s dominant strategy is to report its channel state hon-
estly. In practice, the single-association setting, where a mobile station is only associated
with one base station, is often desirable. We show that the solution using the same fair-
ness criterion in single-association setting is both computationally expensive and prone to
user-manipulation. Alternatively, we propose the Selfish Load Balancing (SLB) allocation
scheme, which always converges to a Nash equilibrium, and often achieves performance
near to CPF allocation.
Next, the thesis studies the cooperative resource provision problem for highly mobile
users in areas where high-bandwidth connection is only available intermittently. We show
that user-contributed mobile forwarding can greatly enhance users’ Internet access expe-
rience. We design MobTorrent, a cooperative, on-demand framework, which uses the
ubiquitous low-bandwidth cellular network as a control channel while forwarding data
through high-bandwidth contacts using a Delay-Tolerant Networking (DTN) approach.
ii
MobTorrent makes use of the semi-deterministic knowledge about future contacts, so that
the user-contributed mobile forwarding process can be efficiently orchestrated.
To foster cooperation among selfish participants in a DTN environment (e.g., as re-
quired by MobTorrent), we propose MobiCent, a credit-based incentive system designed
using the algorithmic mechanism design approach. We prove that the proposed scheme
is incentive compatible, in the sense that rational nodes will not strategically waste any
transfer opportunity or cheat by creating non-existing contacts. MobiCent also provides
different pricing mechanisms to cater to client that wants to minimize either payment or
data delivery delay.
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1.1 Convergence of Heterogeneous Wireless Networks
Development in new wireless access technologies and increase in mobile users’ demands
for ubiquitous high-speed Internet access services are driving the deployment of a wide
array of wireless networks, ranging from satellite networks to Wireless Personal Area
Networks, with Wireless Wide Area (Cellular) Networks and Wireless Local Area (Wi-
Fi) Networks being the two most important components in between.
The cellular network has undergone fast evolution in the last few decades [43, 58].
The first generation (1G) dated back to the late 1970’s, such as AMPS (Advanced Mo-
bile Phone Systems), was an analog system providing voice-only service. In the 1990’s,
the second generation (2G), such as GSM (Global System for Mobile communications),
drove the global penetration of mobile telephony into people’s daily life. The transition
to a digital platform also enabled some primitive but very popular data services, such as
SMS (Short Message Services). To meet the rapid growth of demands for data services,
the 2.5G wireless packet switched systems such as GPRS (General Packet Radio Service)
are introduced to offer better support for data applications. The third generation systems
(3G), developed since the late 1990’s, are designed for multimedia communication. With
data rates as high as several Megabits per second (Mbps), person-to-person communi-
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Figure 1.1: Layers of heterogeneous wireless networks
cation can be enhanced with high-quality images and videos, and fast access to infor-
mation and services on Internet is also available. 3G standards have several variations.
Among which, UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunication System)’s W-CDMA [43]
and Qualcomm’s CDMA2000 [11] are the most widely deployed variants. Both of them
are evolving towards higher data rate, such as HSDPA (High Speed Data Packet Access)
for UMTS, and 1xEV (Evolution) technology (also known as High Data Rate “HDR”)
system for CDMA2000. The long term evolution plans of both systems target to increase
their network capacity further [96]. In contemporary cellular networks, macro-cells each
covering a large area of multiple square kilometers are still the basis to ensure ubiqui-
tous coverage, whereas micro-cells with much smaller footprints are often deployed in
selected areas with high data access demand, to increase the spatial spectrum reuse, thus
network capacity thereof.
Wireless users’ high-speed access requirements that cannot be satisfied timely by cel-
lular network evolution are effectively addressed by WLAN (Wireless Local Area Net-
3work), which is the wireless counterpart of Ethernet. The dominating WLAN standard is
IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi) [5], which operates on license-free ISM frequency bands and sup-
ports high data rate transfer. Wi-Fi networks are widely deployed all around the world.
Service providers are offering hot spot access in airports, hotels and other public areas.
Even residential users can operate as wireless service providers by themselves [37]. While
cellular networks are carefully planned to ensure ubiquitous coverage and meet various
traffic load of different areas, Wi-Fi networks are characterized by clustered and inter-
mittent footprints. In addition, Wi-Fi’s built-in support for ad-hoc mode, which allows
wireless terminals to directly communicate with their peers, provides a more flexible net-
working solution compared to the traditional single-hop cellular network architecture,
and it inspires new networking paradigms to be incorporated into the convergent wireless
communication platform, which will be discussed later in Section 1.2.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the different layers of existing heterogeneous wireless networks.
As each of these networks has complementary design tradeoffs in coverage, data rates
and many other network parameters, it is widely agreed that they will coexist in the future
and be integrated together to offer mobile users “Always Best Connections” [15, 39].
In addition to horizontal handover in the same layer of wireless network, a multi-mode
wireless terminal, which is equipped with multiple radio interfaces or Software Defined
Radio (SDR) [77], can also vertically handover to another layer when a more suitable
access technology is available, or even simultaneously use multiple heterogeneous access
technologies to achieve aggregate bandwidth [45].
From the system’s point of view, the convergence of several heterogeneous networks
into a single logical platform also promises the best of all components, including union
of the network coverage and aggregation of the network capacity. An integrated plat-
form brings the “trunking gain” to the system, by helping service providers manage the
load better, such that the traffic demands varying with location and time can be largely
smoothed. For example, if a Wi-Fi hotspot becomes overloaded, some mobile stations
(MS) associating with the Wi-Fi access point (AP) can be directed to an overlapping 3G
4base station (BS), and vice-versa.
To realize the envisioned benefits, a lot of research [1, 2, 17, 29] has been devoted to
address a multitude of challenges, including: mobility management, AAA (Authentica-
tion, Authorization and Accounting) service, QoS (Quality of Service) guarantee, access
network capacity provision, core network convergence, etc.
As the supporting network protocols are ready, and the various radio access networks
begin to interwork with each other, the following resource management problem arises:
how to allocate the radio resources from the heterogeneous network components coordi-
nately, such that users can be served in a fair and efficient way?
Existing resource allocation schemes in wireless networks often exhibit a disconnec-
tion between the following two layers: the inter-cell association control layer that decides
which BS1 a MS should associate with, and the intra-cell allocation layer that determines
how radio resource of a single BS should be shared among its associated MSs. On one
hand, the inter-cell association control is often carried out using some simple heuristics,
e.g., assigning a MS to the BS with the best signal strength, or to the BS with the least
population. On the other hand, the intra-cell scheduling is executed only based on a local
view. This disconnection often leads the system to a sub-optimal state from a global point
of view.
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, we consider inter-cell association control and intra-cell
allocation together, and propose schemes that allocate the resource fairly and efficiently
in a network-wide context. Fairness, efficiency, and load balancing are incorporated in a
succinct mathematical formulation of the proposed coordinated radio resource allocation
schemes for such a multi-cell overlapping environment.
1Without ambiguity, we use BS as a general term to refer to both cellular base station and Wi-Fi access
point.
51.2 User-contributed Mobile Forwarding
In addition to the coordination of heterogeneous radio access technologies as described
above, convergence of heterogeneous wireless networks also encompasses the integration
of a variety of novel cooperative networking paradigms. One prominent direction of
innovation is the incorporation of multi-hop ad-hoc networking model with the traditional
single-hop cellular network architecture. This general paradigm is often called multi-
hop cellular networks (MCNs) [65]. A number of MCN-type frameworks have been
studied. Some of these frameworks propose to deploy dedicated relaying entities for
data forwarding, such as the proposal by Wu et al. [109], and the proposal by Fitzek et
al. [36]. We refer to this type of relay stations as fixed relays. Alternatively, the mobile
users themselves may forward data for each other, as suggested by Lin and Hsu [66],
Wu et al. [111], Aggelou et al. [3], Hsieh et al. [44], Zadeh et al. [112], Luo et al. [69],
Bhargava et al. [13], Hu and Zhang [47], and Lee et al. [59]. We refer to these forms
of relay stations as mobile relays. We focus on the category of user-contributed mobile




Figure 1.2: User-contributed forwarding using a multi-hop end-to-end path
The basic idea of MCN is illustrated in the example of Figure 1.2, where the client
has both a 3G cellular link and a Wi-Fi based peer-to-peer link. As it situates in the
fringe of the 3G cell, it experiences poor channel condition with the cellular BS. To make
more efficient use of the spectrum, instead of sending data directly to the client in a
single hop, the cellular BS forwards packets for it to a proxy client (Relay A) with better
6channel quality. Relay A then uses an ad-hoc network probably composed of other users
(Relay B in this example) and Wi-Fi links to forward the packets to the specified client.
By leveraging a multi-hop path, the client can significantly improve its data throughput.
Additionally, the enhanced transmission efficiency of these “resource-inefficient” clients
results in less consumption of radio resources, thus can improve the performance of other
clients in the same cell that are not even aware of the multi-hop forwarding. Furthermore,
the relaying mechanism can effectively extend service coverage area, and can also help
to achieve better load balance by dynamically diverting the traffic load from a hot cell
(highly loaded cell) to a cool cell (lightly loaded cell) through relay nodes.
In frameworks proposed above, the peer-to-peer connection is often based on short-
range radio transmission like Wi-Fi, and nodes can communicate with each other only
when they are relatively close. As the locations of mobile users are essentially unplanned
and largely unpredictable, a high-throughput end-to-end path may not exist in many re-
alistic settings with sparse and highly mobile users, like vehicular networks or mobile
human social networks. In particular, if the Internet access gateways are Wi-Fi APs,
which themselves have short transmission range and provide only intermittent coverage,
the probability of having contemporaneous multi-hop connectivity becomes extremely
low.
While all existing MCN frameworks assume the existence of an end-to-end relay-
ing path, the contemporaneous end-to-end connectivity is not a prerequisite to employ
user-contributed mobile forwarding for delay-tolerant applications, like downloading a
big file from Internet. For such applications, the Delay-Tolerant Networking (DTN) ap-
proach can be used to opportunistically exploit the available intermittent contacts for data
delivery [25, 35, 49, 115]. The proposed DTN solution adopts the idea of store, carry,
and forward, where a mobile node stores and carries the data until the client or another
mobile relay moves into its vicinity, so that it can forward the data to the latter. The idea
of DTN forwarding is illustrated in Figure 1.3, where Relay A retrieves the client’s data










Figure 1.3: User-contributed forwarding using a DTN approach
when it meets another node Relay B. Relay B carries on with the data, until it meets the
client to complete the data delivery. As contacts are often unpredictable, forwarding (or
replication) of data among mobile relays happens in an opportunistic manner. To increase
the delivery ratio and reduce the delivery delay, data are often propagated along multiple
paths simultaneously (e.g., the AP also replicates the same data to Relay D as shown in
Figure 1.3), in the hope that at least one of the relays can meet the client.
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of this thesis, we study the resource provision problem
for highly mobile users in areas where high-bandwidth connection is only available inter-
mittently. Previously, the application of DTN routing approach is considered only in sce-
narios without infrastructure support, such as inter-planetary networks, wildlife tracking,
disaster relief team networks, or information delivery for remote villages and nomadic
people. We are the first to introduce the DTN-routing paradigm to enhance the perfor-
mance of cellular network infrastructure. Our results show that, if the cooperation among
participants can be efficiently orchestrated and properly fostered, user-contributed mobile
forwarding can greatly enhance mobile users’ Internet access experience.
81.3 Selfish User Behavior and Algorithmic Mechanism
Design
With increased intelligence, the new generation of wireless terminals not only can facili-
tate the radio resource allocation process by feeding back the measured channel state, but
also can contribute to the resource provision process by forwarding data for each other,
as presented above. When users gain more control over their devices, an intelligent and
selfish user can adapt its behavior in order to benefit more from the network, even if doing
so may affect other users and the system’s overall performance.
Thus, the resource allocation and provision schemes for future convergent wireless
networks should take the selfish nature of participants and strategic interactions among
them into consideration. Game theory, and algorithmic mechanism design in particular,
provide a powerful tool to address these challenges [20, 81, 82, 83, 106].
Game theory aims to model situations in which multiple participants select strategies
that have mutual consequences. Following the definitions used by Nisan et al. [82], a game
consists of a set of n players, 1,2, ...,n. Each player i has its own set of possible strategies,
say Si. To play the game, each player i selects a strategy si ∈ Si. We use s = (s1, ...sn) to
denote the vector of strategies selected by the players and S =×iSi to denote the set of all
possible ways in which players can pick strategies. The vector of strategies s ∈ S selected
by the players determines the outcome for each player. If by using a unique strategy, a
user always gets better outcome than using other strategies, independent of the strategies
played by the other players, we say that the strategy is the user’s dominant strategy. If
players select strategies such that, no player can unilaterally change its strategy to gain
more payoff, we say that the game reaches a Nash equilibrium. In another word, every
player is playing the best response to others in a Nash equilibrium. As can be easily
derived, if each user has a dominant strategy, the unique Nash equilibrium in the game is
for each user to adopt its dominant strategy.
Game theory has been widely used in social sciences (most notably economics) and
9other areas since it was formally introduced by J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern in
their 1944 monograph [106]. Computer networks researchers have used game theory
to study Internet, since Internet emerged as a complex ecosystem without any central
control decades ago [82]. However, its application in the research of wireless networks
only began in recent years, as wireless terminals gain increased intelligence and mobile
communication systems evolve towards an increasingly open platform [20].
To illustrate the strategic interactions among users in the forthcoming mobile com-
munication era, we will introduce two games which naturally arise in the resource man-
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0 2 0.5 2.5
2 2 1 1
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3 2.5 2 1.5
(a)
(b)
Figure 1.4: An association game example
In the example of association game as illustrated in Figure 1.4 (a), there are two dual-
radio mobile stations, MS m1 and MS m2, as players. Each of them is equipped with both
a cellular interface and a Wi-Fi interface. Both mobile stations locate in the overlapping
coverage area of a Wi-Fi AP and a cellular BS. However, their channel conditions to the
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AP and the BS are different. MS m1 can communicate with the AP at 2Mbps and with
the BS at 1Mbps, while MS m2 can communicate with the AP at 1Mbps and with the BS
at 2Mbps. If the AP or the BS has only a single associated user, that user can monopolize
all radio resource from the AP (or BS), and get a throughput value equal to its link data
rate. Instead, if two users are simultaneously associated with the AP (or BS), the AP (or
BS) implements some scheduling algorithm to divide its radio resource (e.g. transmission
time slot) among them, so that each user only gets a fraction of its link data rate. Without
loss of generality, we assume that both the AP and the BS adopt the popular time-based
fair scheduling scheme [11, 101], such that the bandwidth allocated to each of the two
users associated with the same AP (or BS) is half of its link data rate.
We assume that both users are running some bandwidth-greedy applications, so that
each individual always prefers higher bandwidth allocation. For a player, its strategies
include: (1) turn off both interfaces (None), (2) turn on the Wi-Fi interface only (Wi-
Fi Only), (3) turn on the cellular interface only (Cellular Only), and (4) turn on both
interfaces simultaneously to achieve aggregate throughput (Both). The reward matrix (in
terms of the aggregate throughput value for each user) can be easily calculated as in Figure
1.4 (b) (the left entry for the row player MS m2 and the right entry for the column player
MS m1). Clearly, there are sixteen total outcomes depending on the choice made by each
of the two users.
The unique Nash equilibrium in this game is that both users turn on both of their
interfaces; in each of the other fifteen cases, at least one of the players can switch to the
Both strategy to improve its own payoff. On the other hand, a better outcome for both
players happens when MS m1 uses the Wi-Fi interface only, and MS m2 uses the cellular
interface only. However, this is not a Nash equilibrium, since each of the players would
be tempted to turn on its silent interface and thereby increase its throughput.
A similar dilemma happens also in the user-contributed mobile forwarding scenario
as depicted in Figure 1.5 (a). In this example of mobile forwarding game, we also assume
that there are two mobile stations, MS m1 and MS m2, as players. Each of them has a
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Figure 1.5: A mobile forwarding game example
unique file, which is denoted as file A and file B respectively. A client is interested to
get both files. Without loss of generality, we assume that the client is willing to pay 1
cent for each new file, and the reward will be shared equally among all relays on the DTN
forwarding path with the minimum delay. We assume that both MS m1 and MS m2 have a
probability of 0.7 to meet the client directly, and the two contact probabilities are identical
and independent of each other. Suppose MS m1 and MS m2 meet each other before either
of them meets the client. For each player, its strategies include: (1) not replicate its own
file to the other player, and (2) replicate its own file to the other player.
If no replicate happens between the two nodes, each player can only forward its
own file to the client, for which it monopolizes the reward of 1 cent. As each player’s
individual contact probability with the client is 0.7, each of them has an expected reward
of 0.7 cent. Now let us look at the asymmetric setting when MS m1 replicates file A to
MS m2, whereas MS m2 does not replicate file B to MS m1. File A can reach the client
in two ways, either directly from MS m1 in one hop, or via MS m1 and MS m2 in two
hops. Because of the independence assumption, the probability that none of these two
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possibilities happens is (1−0.7)2 = 0.09. As the two possibilities happen with identical
and independent chance, the probability for each of them to happen and happen first is
(1−0.09)/2 = 0.455. On one hand, if file A is delivered first by MS m1 in one hop, MS
m1 monopolizes the 1 cent reward. On the other hand, if file A is delivered first via the
2-hop path consisting of both MS m1 and MS m2, MS m1 need to share the reward with
MS m2. As MS m1 earns reward only from the delivery of file A, its expected gain is
0.455× 1 + 0.455× 0.5 = 0.6825 cent. For MS m2, in addition to the expected gain of
0.7 cent from delivering file B, it can also benefit from the half cent reward by forwarding
file A, if it meets the client earlier than MS m1. Thus, it has a total expected reward of
0.7+0.455×0.5 = 0.9275 cent. Similar analysis can be applied to find the reward for the
situation when MS m2 replicates file B to MS m1, whereas MS m1 does not replicate file
A to MS m2. Finally, when the two MSs carry out mutual replication, both files will be
delivered if at least one MS meets the client. Thus, the delivery probabilities for both files
are 1− (1−0.7)2 = 0.91. The expected total reward is 2×0.91 = 1.82 cent. Because of
the symmetry assumption, the expected reward for each MS is 1.82/2 = 0.91 cent.
The expected rewards for the two MSs in the four possible outcomes are summarized
in Figure 1.5 (b). For each outcome, the left entry represents the reward for the row player
MS m2, and the right entry for the column player MS m1. The unique Nash equilibrium
in this game is that both users do not replicate to each other, despite the fact that mutual
forwarding can increase the expected rewards of both players.
These two games clearly demonstrate that the strategic behavior of selfish users may
lead to a sub-optimal state. In fact, both of them are instantiations of the famous Prisoners’
dilemma [82] in their respective settings.
When we design resource management schemes for next generation mobile commu-
nication systems, the rules of how participants play a game and the outcome of the game
under different combinations of users’ strategies, can be taken into consideration, such
that inefficiency could be potentially avoided or minimized by designing the game care-
fully.
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Algorithmic mechanism design [81, 82] is a subarea of game theory that deals with
the design of games. It studies optimization problems where the underlying data, e.g., the
channel states experienced by MS in the association game, or the replication opportunities
in the mobile forwarding game, are a priori unknown to the algorithm designer, and must
be implicitly or explicitly elicited from selfish participants. The high-level goal is to
design a protocol, or “mechanism”, that interacts with participants so that selfish behavior
yields a desirable outcome. More specifically, a mechanism is incentive compatible, or
strategy-proof, if the dominant strategy of each participant under the designed mechanism
is to reveal its state truthfully. We adopt the algorithmic mechanism design approach
when designing and analyzing the resource management schemes for the forthcoming
generation of mobile communication systems.
1.4 Thesis Contributions
In the era of convergent wireless networks, we need to design new resource management
schemes to explore the cooperation possibility among heterogeneous wireless networks
and their participants, while taking the selfish behavior of users and their strategic inter-
actions into consideration. In this thesis, we investigate the problem of how to deliver
Internet access service cooperatively to (selfish) users using heterogeneous wireless net-
works in an efficient, fair, and incentive-compatible manner.








Figure 1.6: Heterogeneity in coverage
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While cellular networks are carefully planned to ensure ubiquitous coverage and meet
various traffic load of different areas, Wi-Fi networks are characterized by clustered and
intermittent footprints. As shown in Figure 1.6, the heterogeneous geographic distribu-
tion of network coverage and capacity results in two dramatically different scenarios. On
one hand, in “hot” areas where a large number of user demands are expected, such as
shopping malls, hotels, and airports, densely deployed Wi-Fi and cellular networks often
provide overlapping coverage. In these areas, a multi-mode wireless terminal can poten-
tially be associated with one or multiple overlapping BSs. Note that, in such regions,
cellular networks are often deployed as micro-cells (or femtocells), thus provide compa-
rable capacity and coverage as Wi-Fi networks. On the other hand, in the rest of regions,
such as residential areas, natural parks, and highways, high-bandwidth Wi-Fi connection
is available only intermittently, and cellular networks are often deployed as macro-cells,






Incentive compatibility Chapter 4
Figure 1.7: Thesis road map
To realize the vision of next generation mobile communication systems, which promises
the always best connection for mobile users anytime, anywhere, anyhow, resource man-
agement schemes for both overlapping-coverage and intermittent-coverage scenarios should
be designed carefully. This thesis studies both scenarios. For each scenario, we address
the system design problem from two perspectives, as illustrated in Figure 1.7. Firstly, we
consider the problem of how to achieve efficient system performance, given that users
are fully cooperative. Secondly, we study the incentive compatibility problem, and pro-
vide rigorous analysis to show that cooperation can be fostered in the proposed resource
management schemes. This thesis makes the following contributions:
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• We study the coordinated radio resource allocation problem for users being si-
multaneously covered by multiple overlapping heterogeneous wireless networks.
We propose the coordinated proportional fairness (CPF) allocation scheme, which
makes globally fair and efficient allocation decision among networks. The proposed
allocation decision can be calculated efficiently, and our simulations demonstrate
that the proposed algorithms outperform popular heuristic approaches, by striking
a good balance between efficiency and fairness, while achieving load balancing
among network components.
• We formulate the resource allocation process as the multi-cell resource allocation
game. The formulated game is associated with a resource allocation rule, which cal-
culates the bandwidth allocation outcome based on the input from the MS players.
A MS can manipulate its channel state report to game the system.
• Using the proposed game theory framework, we analyze the incentive compatibil-
ity of the multi-cell resource allocation game with CPF allocation scheme as its
associated rule. We show that a multi-cell resource allocation game with CPF al-
location is incentive compatible. However, the positive result does not hold for its
variant in the single-association setting, where a MS is associated with a single BS.
For the single-association setting, we propose the Selfish Load Balancing (SLB) al-
location scheme, which always converges to a Nash equilibrium, and often provides
performance near to CPF allocation.
• To address the challenges of allowing highly mobile users to transfer large amounts
of data in areas with only intermittent but high-bandwidth connections, we pro-
pose MobTorrent, a cooperative, on-demand framework, which uses the ubiquitous
low-bandwidth cellular network as a control channel to exploit the high-bandwidth
intermittent Wi-Fi contacts for data delivery in a Delay-Tolerant Networking (DTN)
approach.
• The scheduling algorithm in MobTorrent makes use of the semi-deterministic knowl-
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edge about future contacts, so that the user-contributed mobile forwarding process
can be efficiently orchestrated. We derive the achievable performance bound, and
show that MobTorrent provides near optimal data delivery performance, in terms of
both the delivery ratio and the delivery delay.
• We consider the incentive design for a DTN environment to foster cooperation
among selfish participants (e.g., as required by MobTorrent). We identify edge in-
sertion attacks and edge hiding attacks as the two major forms of attacks in a DTN
environment. Both of them are difficult to detect, and can seriously degrade the
performance of DTN routing. We formulate these two attacks in the path revelation
game, and show that existing incentive schemes are not incentive compatible.
• We design MobiCent, a credit-based incentive system for DTN. We prove that the
proposed scheme is incentive compatible under the two attacks, in the sense that a
MS cannot increase its reward by launching edge insertion attacks and edge hiding
attacks. MobiCent also provides different pricing mechanisms to cater to client that
wants to minimize either payment or data delivery delay.
1.5 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 studies the coordinated radio resource allocation problem for users that
are simultaneously covered by multiple overlapping heterogeneous wireless networks.
We formulate the coordinated proportional fairness (CPF) resource allocation criterion,
based on which a globally fair and efficient allocation decision can be easily computed.
A multi-cell resource allocation game is formulated to capture the selfish behavior of
users. Based on which, we prove that CPF allocation is incentive compatible. We also
formulate the integral version of the CPF problem (Int-CPF) for the practically desirable
single-association setting, and show that it is both computationally expensive and prone to
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user-manipulation. Alternatively, we propose the Selfish Load Balancing (SLB) scheme,
which always leads to a Nash equilibrium, and often achieves performance near to CPF
allocation.
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 address the challenges in the intermittent-coverage scenario.
Chapter 3 presents MobTorrent, a cooperative, on-demand framework to provide Inter-
net access for vehicles. MobTorrent uses the ubiquitous low-bandwidth cellular network
as a control channel, while forwarding data through high-bandwidth contacts in a DTN
paradigm. We study the problem of how to schedule the transmission over intermittent
contacts, such that the amount of data delivered is maximized and the delay is minimized.
After MobTorrent, we present in Chapter 4 the design of MobiCent, a credit-based
incentive system for DTN. MobiCent is largely motivated by, and directly designed upon
MobTorrent. In this chapter, we formulate the path revelation game with both edge in-
sertion attacks and edge hiding attacks. We characterize the necessary conditions for a
payment scheme to be incentive compatible under edge insertion attacks. Two different
pricing mechanisms are designed to cater to client that wants to minimize either pay-
ment or data delivery delay. We prove that both of the proposed schemes are incentive
compatible. As the two attacks are fundamental to the nature of DTN, we expect Mobi-
Cent’s credit-based solution can be extended to foster cooperation in other forms of DTN
systems different from MobTorrent.
Finally, conclusion and possible future works are presented in Chapter 5.
Chapter 2
Coordinated Proportional Fairness for
Overlapping Cells
2.1 Introduction
Overlapping coverage of wireless base stations (BS1) is a common phenomenon in mo-
bile communication systems. For a particular radio access network, neighboring cells or
sectors overlap with each other. In addition, deployment and inter-operation of a wide
array of wireless access networks, ranging from 3G network to Wi-Fi hotspots, open the
opportunity of overlapping coverage from BSs using heterogeneous radio access tech-
nologies. In such an environment, a multi-mode (e.g., Wi-Fi and 3G capable) MS can
flexibly associate with either a Wi-Fi AP or a 3G BS or simultaneously with both (Wi-Fi
and 3G) BSs.
As the various radio access networks begin to interwork with each other, the follow-
ing resource management problem arises: how to allocate the radio resources from the
heterogeneous network components coordinately, such that users can be served in a fair
and efficient way?
As discussed in Chapter 1, new models and techniques should be developed to address




the resource allocation problem in this new environment for the following reasons.
Firstly, existing resource allocation schemes in wireless networks often exhibit a dis-
connection between the following two layers: the inter-cell association control layer that
decides which BS a MS should associate with, and the intra-cell scheduling layer that
determines how radio resource of a single BS should be assigned among its associated
MSs. On one hand, the inter-cell association control is often carried out using some sim-
ple heuristics, e.g., assigning a MS to the BS with the best signal strength, or to the BS
with the least population. On the other hand, the intra-cell scheduling is executed only
based on a local view. When the association decision is made by selfish MSs, a system
without coordination among BSs often operates in a state far from the optimal, as clearly
indicated by the association game example presented in Section 1.3 of Chapter 1.
Secondly, despite the fact that research for wired networks does consider routing (the
wired counterpart of inter-cell association control) and scheduling (the wired counterpart
of intra-cell allocation) together, existing models for wired networks fail to capture some
important characteristics that are unique to wireless networks. In this thesis, we focus on
the aspect that a single MS may experience significantly different channel conditions with
different BSs, and a single BS may experience different channel conditions with different
MSs as well. In addition, the wireless networks often rely on individual MS to measure
and report its current channel states with neighboring BSs, in order to make informed
decisions. This allows an intelligent and selfish MS to game the system by manipulating
its channel report, as to be shown in Section 2.4.3.
In this chapter, we consider the inter-cell association control and intra-cell allocation
together, such that the resource is allocated fairly and efficiently in a network-wide con-
text. The content of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we describe
the system model. In Section 2.3, we review the existing fairness definitions, with an
emphasis on proportional fairness. In Section 2.4, we present our Coordinated Propor-
tional Fairness (CPF) formulation [24], and show that it can be easily solved as a con-
vex programming problem. Considering the strategic behaviors of users, we formulate
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the multi-cell resource allocation game, and show that the CPF mechanism is incentive
compatible. For the practically attractive single-association scenario, where each MS is
associated with a single BS, Section 2.5 formulates the integral variant of the CPF prob-
lem (Int-CPF) and shows that it is NP-hard. Furthermore, the Int-CPF allocation scheme
is not incentive compatible. Alternatively, we present a Selfish Load Balancing (SLB)
scheme, and analyze its convergence. In Section 2.6, we evaluate the performance of the
various schemes proposed, and compare them to some popular heuristics. Section 2.7
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Figure 2.1: A convergent mobile communication system
Our discussion is based on a convergent system of heterogeneous wireless networks
as shown in Figure 2.1. The main components of the considered architecture are: multi-
mode terminals, all-IP core network, and the integrated radio access networks (RANs)
sitting between them. We briefly describe each of them as follows.
• Multi-mode terminals. Ongoing silicon development enables chipmakers to inte-
grate multiple forms of radio access technologies in a single chipset. For example,
Qualcomm’s Snapdragon chipset for mini-notebooks includes Wi-Fi alongside 3G,
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Bluetooth, broadcast TV and GPS (Global Positioning System) capabilities [88].
Shipments of Wi-Fi chips in multi-mode mobile handsets are reported to grow by
more than 50 percent in 2008 and reach 56 million units. The Apple iPhone, which
was introduced in 2007 in the U.S. and expanded to more than 70 countries in 2008,
helps drive that growth with shipments of more than 10 million units. It also helps
set the tone for the industry, making Wi-Fi capability a standard feature on smart-
phones. This trend is expected to be further boosted by the recent development of
SDR (Software Defined Radio) technologies [77, 102].
• All-IP core network. Wireless core networks are quickly evolving to packet switched
IP-based mechanisms [96]. IP layer shields the applications from the underlying
network technologies, thus enabling much richer set of common services to be pro-
vided independent of the access networks. The open specifications and platforms
also greatly facilitate the creation of new service, and enable the use of cheaper,
faster, and better core equipments.
• Integrated Radio Access Networks. As a bridge between the two components above,
flexible architecture capable of managing a large variety of coexisting radio access
networks is being standardized [1, 2, 33]. The proposed Common Radio Resource
Management (CRRM) functions [67, 103] consider the pool of resources in all ra-
dio access technologies (RATs) as a whole, aiming at a better overall performance
than that can be achieved by the stand-alone networks. As shown in the figure,
the common radio resource manager can be interpreted as a logical entity which
gathers input from different RATs (such as Wi-Fi networks and 3G networks), and
coordinates resource allocation decisions among them. Both the input and output
controls are carried out using the CRRM functions.
Consider a set of BSs using heterogeneous radio access technologies controlled by
a single common radio resource manager, we assume that each BS has a fixed amount
of radio resource (e.g. channel or transmit power) and operates orthogonally with each
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other. A common example of such a scenario is a 3G BS and an overlapping Wi-Fi AP.
Note that this model is general and is applicable to cases where the BSs use the same
radio technology as long as the channels are orthogonal. For example, this simplified
model also roughly captures the current operation mode for both Wi-Fi networks and
high data rate cellular networks. For Wi-Fi networks, 802.11b and 802.11g use the 2.4
GHz ISM band, which is divided into 13 channels each of width 22 MHz but spaced only
5 MHz apart, thus offers 3 non-overlapping channels. 802.11a uses the 5 GHz U-NII
band, which offers 12 non-overlapping channels (in FCC and North America standard).
Given the separation between two non-overlapping channels, the signal on one channel
is sufficiently attenuated to minimally interfere with a transmitter on another channel. In
today’s typical deployment, each Wi-Fi AP operates in a single channel that is selected to
be orthogonal to its neighboring APs, if possible. Ideally, there should be no co-channel
APs in the same contention domain. Channel selection for neighboring Wi-Fi APs has
been discussed by Kauffmann et al. [53], and their results demonstrate that interference
among neighboring Wi-Fi APs can be effectively mitigated using the proposed frequency
selection scheme. For cellular networks, we take the widely deployed High Data Rate
(HDR) networks [11] as an example. Using a dedicated RF carrier, the HDR downlink
for each BS is time multiplexed and transmitted at the full power available. To date, the BS
location, antenna down-tilt and transmit power are determined at the time of deployment
and hence are not dynamic.
Though in our model we focus on the case that the radio capacities of BSs are fixed
and orthogonal, they can potentially be adapted to improve the network-wise perfor-
mance. On one hand, Wi-Fi channel bonding is used in “Super G” technology, which
bonds two channels of classic 802.11g to double the PHY data rate. On the other hand,
in HDR networks, transmit power control can be applied to mitigate inter-cell interfer-
ence. For future research, we would like to incorporate the BS capacity adaptation into
the consideration of the network-wide radio resource allocation.
We say there is a link l = (m,b) between a MS m and a BS b if they are able to
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communicate with each other. We call such a pair an adjacent MS-BS pair. The input for
CRRM is the channel states for all adjacent MS-BS pairs. We focus on the downlink from
BS to MS. In wireless networks, the link data rate is determined by the channel condition
between the transceiver and the receiver. For example, in HDR, MSs monitor the pilot
bursts in the downlink channel to estimate the channel conditions in terms of Signal to
Noise Ratio (SNR). This SNR is then mapped into a supported data rate, and fed back in
every time slot to the BS through the data-rate-request channel in the reverse link.
We focus on elastic traffic, which can adapt to the bandwidth allocated by the system.
To simplify the discussion, we assume that a user will consume all the bandwidth allocated
and the queues are backlogged. The allocated bandwidth for a MS on a link is the product
of the link data rate and the fraction of the radio resource allocated by the corresponding
BS. Thus, the bandwidth equals to the link data rate only if the MS monopolizes the radio
resource of the BS. Otherwise, the bandwidth of a MS is a fraction of its link data rate. In
both Wi-Fi networks and HDR networks, time multiplexing is used to share the resource
of BS among its associated MSs, i.e., data transfers to different users are scheduled at
different time slots. Thus, the resource consumptions by different links at the same BS
are orthogonal, and can be linearly summed up. In addition, we assume that there is no
constraint in the number of MSs that can be associated to a BS2.
Because of the lossy nature of wireless communication and the scarcity of spectrum
resource, the wireless links are likely to be the bottleneck of the system described in Fig-
ure 2.1. Thus, a radio resource management scheme, which allocates the combined radio
resource in a fair, efficient, and load-balancing way, is the key to meet mobile customers’
requirements. Fairness, efficiency, and load balancing need to be considered together
when designing radio resource allocation schemes for such a multi-cell environment. On
one hand, a scheme which maximizes only the aggregate system throughput, or equiv-
alently, the arithmetic mean of per-user throughput values, results in the starvation of
2There are 60 Walsh codes for orthogonal transmission in HDR. This puts an upper bound of 60 active
users per BS at any given time. However, the limit of 60 users is rarely reached in practice.
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resource-inefficient users, because it allocates all system resources to the users with the
best link data rate. On the other hand, a scheme which makes users’ allocation data rates
as equal as possible, or equivalently, maximizes the minimum per-user throughput value,
regardless of their link data rate, often results in poor overall system performance in wire-
less networks, as shown in Section 2.3.1. In addition, a scheme considering only each
individual cell can easily lead to unfairness among users located in different areas.
2.3 Fairness Definition
Before we formulate the coordinated proportional fairness (CPF) resource allocation cri-
terion, we first briefly review several important fairness definitions in computer networks
literature.
2.3.1 Max-min Fairness
The most common understanding of fairness in computer networks is probably the max-
min fairness, as defined by Bertsekas and Gallager [12]: rates are made as equal as pos-
sible subject only to the constraints imposed by link capacities. Formally, consider a
bandwidth allocation R = (Rm,m ∈ M), where M is the set of users, and Rm is the band-
width allocated to user m ∈M, we define the sorted bandwidth allocation R = (Rm) as the
users’ allocated bandwidths sorted in non-decreasing order.
Definition 2.1 Max-min Fairness [10]: A feasible bandwidth allocation scheme S∗ is
called max-min fair if and only if, for any other feasible bandwidth allocation S, it satis-
fies: R(S∗) has the same or higher lexicographical value than R(S), where R(S) and R(S∗)
are the sorted bandwidth allocation vectors under the two considered schemes S and S∗
respectively.
Although the max-min fairness is Pareto optimal (i.e., any change to make any MS
better off is impossible without making some other MS worse off), it has been criticized
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for favoring too much of resource-inefficient requests, thus it does not make efficient use
of resource. In addition, there appears to be no clear economic reason why max-min
sharing should be preferred over some other bandwidth allocation schemes.
In particular, max-min fairness is not efficient for elastic traffic in a multi-rate wireless
communication system as considered in this thesis, because when some MSs use a lower
bitrate than the others, the performance of all MSs sharing the same BS is considerably
degraded to the same level as the worst one, as shown by Heusse et al. [42]. For example,
802.11b products degrade the bitrate from 11 Mbps to 5.5, 2, or 1 Mbps when repeated
unsuccessful frame transmissions are detected. In such a case, a host transmitting at
1 Mbps reduces the throughput of all other hosts transmitting at higher data rates to a
value below 1 Mbps. The basic CSMA/CA channel access method is at the root of this
anomaly: it guarantees an equal long-term channel access probability to all hosts. Once a
host gets the access opportunity, it starts sending a rate-independent length of frame using
its available bitrate. A host captures the channel for a longer time if its bitrate is lower,
thus it penalizes other hosts that use the higher rates.
2.3.2 Proportional Fairness
Compared to max-min fairness, proportional fairness as proposed by Kelly [55, 56]
strikes a better balance between efficiency and fairness.
Definition 2.2 Proportional Fairness [55]: A feasible bandwidth allocation scheme S∗











where R(S)m and R(S
∗)
m are the rates allocated to user m by the two considered schemes
S and S∗ respectively, and M is the set of users.
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The rationale behind proportional fairness criterion can be interpreted from multiple
angles as follows.
Engineering Viewpoint
Max-min fairness does not allow any increase of a large sharing if the increase is at the
cost of some smaller sharing being decreased, even if significant increase for the large
sharing can be achieved with only minor decrease of the small sharing. Proportional
fairness relaxes this restriction by allowing large sharing to increase further with small
sharing decreased, if changes of the assigned bandwidth vectors result in the sum of the
proportional changes to be non-negative, as shown in Equation 2.1. By doing so, propor-
tional fairness favors resource-efficient requests more than max-min fairness, thus helps
improve system efficiency. On the other hand, although the requirement of non-negative
proportional change is less strict than max-min fairness, proportional fairness still helps
prevent resource-efficient connections from starving resource-inefficient connections to-
tally. It is shown that both max-min fairness and proportional fairness can be viewed
as special cases in a family of fairness definitions striking different tradeoffs between
efficiency and fairness [56].
Utility Maximization Viewpoint
When proportional fairness is proposed [55], it is associated with the optimization of an
objective function representing the overall utility of the flows in progress. The utility
function chosen is logarithmic function of the allocated bandwidth, where the value of a
flow increases with its allocated bandwidth R in proportional to logR. It is shown that the
“proportional fairness” solution as defined in Equation 2.1 maximizes the logarithmic
sum of the user throughput values, which can be formally written as




It’s easy to see that the optimization of the logarithmic sum of the throughput values
is equivalent to the optimization of their product form.
S∗ = argmaxS ∏
m∈M
R(S)m (2.3)
Thus, the objective function of proportional fairness is also equivalent to the opti-
mization of the geometric mean of per-user throughput values, which is the nth root of the
product of all MSs’ throughput values, where n is the number of MSs.
Game Theory Viewpoint
The utility function approach used by Kelly [55] suffers from the disadvantages that user
utilities or preferences are only known in some qualitative sense. Thus, although reason-
able assumptions can be made on the behavior of utility functions, such an approach by
itself still cannot put fairness definition on the foundation of a solid and precise mathe-
matical framework. Another approach taken by Mazumdar et al. [73] is to consider mea-
surable performance characteristics rather than abstract utility functions. In the context
of elastic traffics, such a key metric is the allocated rate. They propose a game theoretic
framework based on choosing this direct metric. Using the Nash bargaining framework
from cooperative game theory [79], they show that proportional fairness is in fact a Nash
Bargaining Solution (NBS) out of all Pareto Optimal points. NBS is the only equilib-
rium satisfying all four axioms as defined by Nash [79], namely: (1) invariance to affine
transformations, (2) Pareto optimality, (3) independence of irrelevant alternatives, and (4)
symmetry.
To summarize, proportional fairness criterion strikes a good balance between fairness
and system efficiency, maximizes a reasonable overall utility function for elastic traffic,
and satisfies the cooperative game theory axioms abstracted by Nash.
In a single-cell environment for both Wi-Fi networks [101] and cellular networks [11],
the proportional fairness is implemented by allocating (asymptotically) the radio resource
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(rather than bandwidth) of a BS equally among associated MSs, regardless of their dif-
ferent efficiency in using the resource, i.e., their various link data rates. If timely channel
feedback is available, channel-aware opportunistic scheduling algorithms [11] are often
employed to exploit the “multi-user diversity”, as in the case of HDR network. In this
work, we consider the time-averaged channel state as input, and assume that the underly-
ing scheduling algorithm of each BS (which can be channel-aware) supports the resource
allocation decision.
2.3.3 Minimum Potential Delay Fairness
Proportional fairness assumes the utility of a flow is a logarithmic utility function where
the value of a flow increases with its allocated bandwidth R in proportion to logR. An
alternative utility function with decreasing gradient is − 1R as suggested by Massoulie´ and
Roberts [71]. It leads to the bandwidth-sharing objective of minimizing the sum of the
reciprocal of rates. This objective may alternatively be interpreted as minimizing the
overall potential delay of the transfers in progress. Formally, minimum potential delay
fairness can be written as:
Definition 2.3 Minimum Potential Delay Fairness [71]: A feasible bandwidth alloca-
tion scheme S∗ is called minimum potential delay fair if and only if:





where R(S)m is the rate allocated to user m by scheme S, and M is the set of users.
In the example studied by Massoulie´ and Roberts [71], they show that this criterion is
intermediate between the max-min fairness and proportional fairness, in that it penalizes
more (less) severely resource-inefficient MSs than max-min (proportional) fairness, re-
sulting in a larger (smaller) overall throughput. Our evaluations in Section 2.6.2 confirm
this property.
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Among all fairness definitions described above, our proposal is based on proportional
fairness, because it is widely adopted in single-cell environment for both high data rate 3G
network [11] and Wi-Fi network [101]. As discussed above, proportional fairness strikes
a good balance between fairness and system efficiency. In addition, its cooperative game
theory interpretation [73] puts it on the foundation of a solid and precise mathematical
framework. We compare proportional fairness scheme with max-min fairness scheme
and minimum potential delay fairness scheme in Section 2.6.2.
2.4 Coordinated Proportional Fairness
Fair scheduling in wireless networks is often considered in a single-cell context, while
the joint routing-scheduling fairness formulation in wired networks cannot be directly ap-
plied to multi-cell wireless networks. In this section, we adopt proportional fairness as a
resource allocation criterion suitable for elastic traffic in multi-rate wireless communica-
tion systems, and extend it to the general setting of overlapping cells from heterogeneous
wireless networks, by defining the coordinated proportional fairness (CPF) allocation
problem.
2.4.1 Formulation
Consider a network with a set B of BSs and a set M of MSs. We let Cb be the finite
radio resource capacity of BS b, for b ∈ B. Based on our system model as described
in Section 2.2, Cb is fixed, and is independent of each other. We assume that each MS
is equipped with sufficient number of radios, thus it can simultaneously associate with
multiple neighboring BSs to achieve aggregate throughput. We will relax this assumption
in Section 2.5.
Recall that a link l = (m,b) represents an adjacent pair of MS and BS that are able to
communicate with each other. Given a link l, we use b(l) to denote the corresponding BS,
and m(l) to denote the corresponding MS. We write L for the set of all links. If b = b(l),
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we set Abl to be the required radio resource in BS b to support per unit flow through link
l. If the channel condition between m(l) and b(l) is poor, it can only support a low data
rate, thus more radio resource is required to transfer a unit of flow, which implies a higher
resource consumption rate, i.e., Abl is larger. On the other hand, if a MS-BS link is under
good channel condition, less resource is required to transfer the same amount of data,
i.e., Abl is smaller. As wireless channel state keeps changing with time, the value of Abl
used in our problem formulation is a time-averaged link state that is relatively stable for
a decision period. For b 6= b(l), we set Abl = 0, because sending flow over link l does not
consume any resource of BS b. This defines a matrix A = (Abl,b ∈ B, l ∈ L).
For a given MS m, its several links through different BSs may substitute for one
another. Formally, suppose that a MS m has a subset of L. We write Hml = 1 if m = m(l),
so that link l serves the MS m, and set Hml = 0 otherwise. This defines a 0-1 matrix
H = (Hml,m ∈M, l ∈ L).
A flow pattern y = (yl, l ∈ L) supports the rates x = (xm,m ∈M) if Hy = x, so that the



























































},l ,l ,l ,{l L
},b ,{b  B





Figure 2.2: CPF allocation example I
To illustrate the notations, we look at Figure 2.2 (a), which depicts the same setting
as in the association game example in Section 1.3 of Chapter 1. We assume that the
31





of MS m1 and MS m2 is equipped with both a cellular interface and a Wi-Fi interface.
Both MSs locate in the overlapping coverage area of a Wi-Fi AP b1 and a cellular BS
b2. However, their channel conditions to the Wi-Fi AP and the cellular BS are different
because of their different locations. MS m1 can communicate with the Wi-Fi AP at a
link data rate of 2Mbps and with the cellular BS at a link data rate of 1Mbps, while
MS m2 can communicate with the Wi-Fi AP at a link data rate of 1Mbps and with the
cellular BS at a link data rate of 2Mbps. There are 4 links corresponding to the 4 adjacent
MS-BS pairs. We denote them as l1 = (m1,b1), l2 = (m1,b2), l3 = (m2,b1), and l4 =
(m2,b2) respectively. The input to CPF allocation problem is: MS set M = {m1,m2},




, matrix A =

1
2 0 1 0
0 1 0 12

, and matrix H =

 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1

. Note that the allocated bandwidth for
a MS on a link equals to its link data rate only if the MS monopolizes the radio resource
of the corresponding BS. Otherwise, the bandwidth of a MS over a link is the product of
the link data rate and the portion of resource allocated by the corresponding BS.
A flow pattern y is feasible if y ≥ 0 and Ay ≤ C, so that the resource consumed by
wireless links through a BS b sum to not more than its capacity. Based on our system
model as described in Section 2.2, we assume that wireless transmissions are “orthogo-
nal”, thus resource consumed by different links at the same BS can be linearly summed
up.
Formally, the Coordinated Proportional Fairness (CPF) allocation is the optimal




s.t. Hy = x,Ay≤C
over x,y ≥ 0 (2.5)
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where wm > 0 is the weight assigned to different users representing their different
priorities.
We consider only MSs with non-empty set of adjacent BSs, and BSs with non-empty
set of adjacent MSs. Under this assumption, there are feasible allocations with the ob-
jective function bounded away from negative infinity, which implies that in the optimal
solution, xm for any MS m is bounded away from 0. Intuitively, not allocating any band-
width to a connected user (despite its potentially poor channel condition) is considered
unfair. Without affecting the calculation of the optimal solution, we can safely assume
that each connected user m can get a minimum positive bandwidth allocation ε from the
system, which translates to a lower bound wmlog(ε) for m’s utility function. We thus can
define the utility function over the domain of x≥ ε to ensure that the user’s utility function
is bounded from below. We can further add a constant value (e.g. −wmlog(ε)) to each
user’s utility function, such that its range is within the set of non-negative numbers. Note
that, incorporation of additive constant values into the utility functions does not change
the solution as defined in Equation 2.5.
The objective function is differentiable and strictly concave and the feasible region
is compact. Thus, a maximizing value of (x,y) always exists and can be found by La-
grangian methods. There is a unique optimum for the rate vector x, since the objective
function is a strictly concave function of x, but there may be many corresponding values





(a) Wired network (b) Wireless network
r1
r2
Figure 2.3: Resource sharing in wired and wireless contexts
We briefly discuss the difference between our model and Kelly’s original model for
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wired networks [55].
As shown in Figure 2.3 (a), resources in wired networks are characterized directly in
terms of bandwidth (such as a router’s interface forwarding speed), and a resource can
serve all routes passing through it with the same efficiency, so data rate and consumed
resource can be treated equivalently. In contrast, to support per unit flow in wireless net-
works, different amount of radio resource (e.g., time slot, spectrum, power, or code words)
is required due to location-dependent and time-varying channel condition, as shown in
Figure 2.3 (b).
Compared to Kelly’s original model for wired networks, our formulation changes
the definition of A from a 0-1 matrix to a matrix with elements taking non-negative real
values, to characterize the different link-dependent resource consumption rate in wireless
networks.
Note that, both max-min fairness and minimum potential delay fairness can be ex-
tended to multi-cell in a similar way [10, 53]. We call them Coordinated Max-min Fair-
ness and Coordinated Minimum Potential Delay Fairness. We will compare the perfor-
mance of these three coordinated fairness definitions in Section 2.6.2 and discuss the
related work in Section 2.7.
2.4.2 Example
Let us look at the CPF allocation in the setting as shown in Figure 2.2.
Using Lagrangian method [108], the CPF solution for the given example is: x =
[2,2]T , y = [2,0,0,2]T . The solution is Pareto-optimal. MS m1 is served totally over link
l1 = (m1,b1), and MS m2 is served over link l4 = (m2,b2). Both m1 and m2 are assigned
to their interface with more favorable channel condition, i.e., link with smaller resource
consumption rate.
By considering fairness in a global sense (among all MSs), the CPF allocation so-
lution automatically results in inter-cell load balance. For example, as shown in Figure
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Figure 2.4: CPF allocation example II
only a link data rate of 0.8Mbps. BS b2 becomes more congested than BS b1, in the
sense that BS b2 requires extra capacity in order to support the original allocation as in




2 0 1 0





 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1

 remains the same. The CPF solution becomes x = [1.8,0.9]T , and
y = [1.8,0,0.1,0.8]T . The CPF allocation automatically shifts some load introduced by
m2 from b2 to b1. Note that, the resource-efficient MS m1 has a higher throughput than
the resource-inefficient MS m2.
A third example is shown in Figure 2.5, where an additional active MS m3 appears
in the area covered only by BS b2, thus making the traffic load even more asymmetric.
We denote the new adjacent MS-BS pair as link l5 = (m3,b2). The matrix A becomes

1
2 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 10.8 1

, and the matrix H becomes


1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1

. The CPF solution
becomes x = [1.2,0.6,0.75]T , and y = [1.2,0,0.4,0.2,0.75]T. The CPF allocation shifts
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Figure 2.5: CPF allocation example III
Note that, under the CPF allocation, individual BS does not enforce time-based fair
allocation among nodes associated with it. As shown in the second and third example,
the CPF solution often requires a MS to be simultaneously assigned to multiple BSs.
Further, the change of a single input parameter may change allocation decision for all
MS-BS pairs. These factors need to be taken into consideration when implementing such
a scheme in practice.
2.4.3 Incentive Compatibility
CPF allocation decision is based on the link state information of all adjacent MS-BS
pairs. In practice, the link data rate is measured by individual MS, which periodically
feeds it back to the common radio resource manager using CRRM functions for informed
decision [1, 2, 33]. Thus, an intelligent and selfish MS can manipulate its reported link
states, if it can gain more from the network by doing so.
Based on this observation, a multi-cell resource allocation procedure can be inter-
preted as a game, where each MS is a player. The strategy of a MS m can be described
as a link data rate vector Rm = (Rmb,b ∈ B), where Rmb gives the data rate supported be-
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tween the MS m and a BS b. The resource allocation outcome is calculated according to
the allocation scheme employed by the common radio resource manager, and individual
BS enforces the decision. If the reported link data rate Rmb between the MS m and the BS
b is not equal to the actual link data rate R∗mb, the effective data rate will be less than R∗mb.
On one hand, if Rmb < R∗mb, data are transferred by the BS using Rmb. On the other hand,
if Rmb > R∗mb, data are transferred by the BS at a rate higher than that can be fully decoded
by the MS, the resulted effective data rate becomes lower than that can be achieved by
the most appropriate rate R∗mb. Note that, by collecting the link state vector Rm from each
m ∈ M, the link vector L, matrix A and H required in calculating the CPF allocation can
be derived accordingly. As over-report can be easily detected [117], we focus on the case
where m may under-report its channel state, i.e. Rmb ≤ R∗mb.
Formally, a multi-cell resource allocation game is defined as (M,R∗,R,S,x), where
• M is the set of MS players.
• R∗ = (R∗m,m∈M) consists of the actual link data rate vector R∗m for each MS m∈M.
• R =×mRm,m ∈M, where Rm = {Rm|Rm ≤ R∗m} specifies the strategy space of MS
m. m can choose any link data rate vector Rm ∈Rm when playing the game.
• S is an allocation scheme that determines the allocation vector based on the speci-
fied channel state input R ∈ R.
• x = (xm,m ∈M) gives the allocated data rate vector.
Theorem 2.1 proves the positive result that in the multi-cell resource allocation game
with CPF as the allocation scheme S, the dominant strategy for any MS is to report its
channel state truthfully. We adopt the algorithmic mechanism design approach to ana-
lyze the game. As described in Section 1.3 of Chapter 1, algorithmic mechanism de-
sign [81, 82] studies optimization problems where the underlying data (the link data rates
with neighboring BSs as measured by individual MS in our multi-cell resource allocation
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game), is a priori unknown to the algorithm designer (the common radio resource man-
ager in our game), and must be implicitly or explicitly elicited from selfish participants
(through the periodic feedbacks of MSs using CRRM function in our game). The high-
level goal is to design a mechanism (the allocation scheme in our game), that interacts
with participants so that selfish behavior yields a desirable outcome (a fair and efficient
resource allocation in our game). Recall that, a mechanism is said to be incentive com-
patible, or strategy-proof, if the dominant strategy of each participant under the designed
mechanism is to truthfully reveal its state (each MS reports honestly its channel state in
our game). In contrast, if a game is not incentive compatible, a MS can gain by cheating
about its state, thus making the system operate under an inefficient state. Even worse,
MSs may keep varying their behavior as response to others’ strategies, which can lead to
instability problem.
Theorem 2.1 A multi-cell resource allocation game with CPF allocation scheme is in-
centive compatible.
Proof: We prove this property by contradiction. We assume that there is a user m∗
which can increase its aggregate bandwidth allocation by not using the truthful strategy.
We denote the allocation decision for the original setting, where m∗ does not cheat, as
D′ = (x′,y′), and the allocation decision for the new setting, where m∗ cheats, as D′′ =
(x′′,y′′).
Given a MS m, we denote the subset of its adjacent BSs that allocate strictly more







Given a BS b, we denote the subset of its adjacent MSs that get strictly lower radio







Denote the initial BS set as B0 = B+(m∗). Based on our assumption, we have x′′m∗ >
x′m∗ . Thus, there must be some BSs which allocate more resource to m∗ in D′′ than in D′.
More specifically, B0 6= /0.
Denote the initial MS set as M0 = ∪b∈B0M−(b). As a BS b ∈ B0 allocates more
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resource to m∗ in D′′, and in both solutions D′ and D′′ it allocates all of its resources, it
must reduce allocation to some other MS in D′′. Thus, M0 6= /0.
























λm(l) = µb(l)Ab(l)l if yl > 0
≤ µb(l)Ab(l)l if yl = 0 (2.10)
The Lagrange multipliers λ and µ have simple interpretations. We may view µb as
the implied cost of using unit radio resource of BS b, or alternatively the shadow price
of adding additional radio resource at BS b. λm can be viewed as the weighted charge of
unit flow for MS m.
As x′′m∗ > x′m∗ , because of Equation 2.9, λ′′m∗ < λ′m∗ . Thus, for any b ∈ B0, because of










As B is a finite set, the process always terminates at some n = n∗ where Bn∗+1 = Bn∗ .
For each expansion step, the argument about the change of Lagrange multipliers as in the
initial step can still be applied, thus: x′′m > x′m,∀m ∈ Mn∗ .
Consider Bn∗ and Mn∗ . For any MS m ∈Mn∗ , its allocated data rate strictly increases.
For any MS m /∈ Mn∗ , its radio resource allocation from any BS b ∈ Bn∗ is not reduced
according to the definitions above. Thus, BSs in Bn∗ jointly allocate higher data rate in D′′
to all MS m ∈ Mn∗ without affecting their allocation to any MS outside Mn∗ . Combining
the resource allocation decision of D′′ for BSs in Bn∗ and the allocation decision of D′
for BSs not in Bn∗ , we have a feasible allocation solution x˜ for the original setting where
m∗ is honest. For MS m∗, x˜m∗ is the aggregate rate of m∗ using the actual link data rate,
thus, we have x˜m∗ ≥ x′′m∗ > x′m∗ . For m ∈ Mn∗ and m 6= m∗, their reported data link rates
are the same for the two settings, thus x˜m ≥ x′′m > x′m. Similarly, for m /∈ Mn∗ , x˜ ≥ x′. As
the vector x˜ is strictly larger than x′, this contradicts with the fact that x′ is Pareto optimal
under the original setting where m∗ is honest.
2.5 Integral Coordinated Proportional Fairness
The optimal solution for the CPF allocation often requires MSs to be simultaneously
assigned to multiple BSs, which may not be desirable in practice, due to the following
reasons:
• It requires a node to be equipped with multiple simultaneous active radios. On one
hand, a software defined radio that can dynamically switch to different radio access
technologies may not satisfy such requirement, as it cannot simultaneously present
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in multiple overlapping cells. On the other hand, turning on multiple radios can
significantly increase the power consumption.
• When a single parameter changes in the network, the allocation decision may be
adjusted globally. This may result in both system instability and excessive signaling
overhead.
• Transport protocol at client may have difficulty to efficiently aggregate bandwidths
from multiple interfaces, especially when the allocated bandwidth of each interface
varies with time [45].
Thus, in this section, we study resource allocation schemes in a single-association
setting, which associates each MS with a single BS.
2.5.1 Formulation and Complexity
The formulation for the CPF allocation can be modified to reflect the additional constraint
in single-association setting.
Formally, the Integral Coordinated Proportional Fairness (Int-CPF) allocation is




s.t. Hy = x,Ay≤C
∀m ∈M,∃lm ∈ L,∀l 6= lm,Hmlyl = 0
over x > 0,y≥ 0 (2.13)
If we decouple the solution for Int-CPF allocation scheme into the inter-cell associa-
tion control layer and the intra-cell scheduling layer, we observe that, given its allocated
MSs, the strategy for a BS in the second layer to optimize the defined objective function,
is independent of the association control decision in the first layer and the second layer
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strategy of each other. This is because one MS is served by a single BS, thus, every single
BS should maximize the weighted logarithmic sum of data rates of the MSs assigned to it,
and it can achieve this by employing individual proportional fairness scheduling. As the
second level scheduling is clear, the remaining problem is to decide for each MS which
BS it should associate to.
We show that, for Int-CPF allocation scheme, there does not exist an algorithm that
can find the optimal solution in polynomial time unless P = NP, i.e., the problem is NP-
hard. Similar to Lenstra et al. [61] and Bu et al. [16], our reduction is via 3-dimensional
matching problem that is known to be NP-complete. The 3-dimensional matching prob-
lem is stated as follows.
Definition 2.4 Let X = {x1, . . . ,xn}, Y = {y1, . . . ,yn}, Z = {z1, . . . ,zn} be three disjoint
sets with identical size n, and T is a subset of X ×Y ×Z. That is, T consists of triples
(x,y,z) such that x∈ X, y∈Y , and z∈ Z. A T ′⊆ T is a 3-dimensional matching if |T ′|= n
and ∪ti∈T ′ti = B∪C∪D. The problem is to find whether such a T ′ exists.
Theorem 2.2 Int-CPF allocation problem is NP-hard.
Proof: Consider a 3-dimensional matching problem where T consists of k triples
(k > n) and ∪ti∈T ti = B∪C∪D, otherwise the problem becomes trivial. We construct a
corresponding Int-CPF allocation problem as follows. For each tripe ti ∈ T , we create
a corresponding BS ti with capacity 1. We create two types of MSs: normal MS and
privileged MS. For each element m ∈ X ∪Y ∪Z, we create a corresponding normal MS
m. There are totally 3n normal MSs. A normal MS m is covered by a BS ti if and only
if m ∈ ti. In addition, we create k− n privileged MSs, which are covered by all BSs.
We assume that the link data rates of all adjacent MS-BS pairs are equal to a constant
R. A normal MS has weight 1, and a privileged MS has weight wp > 2. The weight
of privileged MS is selected such that, if possible, packing the 3n normal MSs into n
BSs, while assigning each of the k− n privileged MSs into each of the rest of k− n
BSs, gives the highest value of Umax = ∑m∈M wmlog(xm) = 3nlog(R3 )+(k−n)wplog(R).
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Thus, it is easy to verify that if there is a 3-dimensional matching solution T ′, the Int-
CPF allocation problem achieves the optimal solution Umax. Conversely, if the Int-CPF
allocation problem achieves the optimal solution Umax, there is a 3-dimensional matching
solution for the original problem.
Suppose wm = 1,∀m ∈ M. If we know the congestion vector (Nb,b ∈ B) for the
optimal solution of Int-CPF problem, where Nb denotes the number of MSs assigned to a
BS b, we can reduce the problem of finding the optimal solution for Int-CPF allocation to
finding the maximum weight perfect k-matching in a bipartite graph as follows. Consider
the bipartite graph G(M,B,L) where M denotes the MSs, B denotes the BSs, and L is the
set of adjacent edges. The requirement (k-value) of each MS m ∈M is 1. For a BS b ∈ B,
its requirement k(b) = Nb. The weight on each edge (m,b) is set to w(m,b) = log(RmbNb ),
where Rmb is the link data rate between MS m and BS b. The optimal Int-CPF allocation
corresponds to the maximum weight perfect k-matching, as each MS is associated with
one BS, each BS gets the number of MSs as specified by the optimal congestion vector,
and the logarithmic sum of allocated data rates for all MSs is maximized. Note that the
number of possible congestion vectors is polynomial in the number of MSs |M| and can be
enumerated if the number of BSs |B| is a constant. In our evaluation, we use this approach
to calculate the solution of Int-CPF allocation for a constant number of BSs.
2.5.2 Incentive Compatibility
In contrast to the multi-cell allocation game with CPF allocation scheme, the multi-cell
allocation game with Int-CPF allocation scheme is not incentive compatible.
Theorem 2.3 A multi-cell resource allocation game with Int-CPF allocation scheme is
not incentive compatible.
Proof: The theorem can be easily proved by providing counter examples.
In the example of Figure 2.6 (a), there is a MS m1 covered by both a Wi-Fi AP b1




(a) MS m1 may cheat to gain
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Figure 2.6: Cheating under Int-CPF allocation
there is a MS m2 which is covered only by BS b2 with link data rate of 2Mbps. Recall that
each BS’s capacity is fixed, and the bandwidth allocated to a MS on a link is the product
of the link data rate and the fraction of the radio resource allocated by the corresponding
BS. The Int-CPF allocation is to assign MS m1 to b1, and MS m2 to b2, thus m1 gets
an allocation of 0.9Mbps, and m2 gets an allocation of 2Mbps. However, if m1 cheats
by hiding its association with b1, i.e., set the data rate of link (m1,b1) to 0, the Int-CPF
allocation is to assign both m1 and m2 to b2, and allocate half the resource to each of
them. In this case, m1 gets a higher throughput of 1Mbps, whereas m2’s throughput is
reduced to 1Mbps.
This example shows that a MS with multiple adjacent BSs can manipulate its adjacent
BS set, so as to be allocated to its favored BS.
On the other hand, the example of Figure 2.6 (b) shows that, a MS can also manipulate
its reported data rate to increase its benefit by changing other MS’s association. In the
given setting, both MS m1 and MS m2 are covered by both the Wi-Fi AP b1 and the
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cellular BS b2. Their link data rates to the AP and the BS are shown in the figure. It is
easy to verify that, the Int-CPF allocation is to assign m1 to b1 and m2 to b2, such that the
throughput of m1 is 1.9Mbps and the throughput of m2 is 1Mbps. If m2 cheats by hiding
its adjacency with b2, i.e., set the data rate of link (m2,b2) to 0, the Int-CPF allocation
will swap the assignment, with m2 associated to b1 and m1 to b2. Thus, the throughput of
m2 increases to 1.1Mbps.
The example of Figure 2.6 (b) also shows that both the optimal Integral Coordinated
Max-min Fairness [10] and the optimal Integral Coordinated Minimum Potential Delay
Fairness [71] are not incentive compatible.
As we can scale the data rate such that the aggregate utility in the optimal solution is
strictly greater than 0, while the aggregate utility in a Nash equilibrium is 0, the price of
anarchy, which is defined as the ratio between the optimal social utility and the utility of
the worst Nash equilibrium point of the game is unbounded. For example, in Figure 2.6
(a), the optimal social utility is log(0.9)+ log(2) > 0, whereas the social utility under the
Nash equilibrium point is log(1)+ log(1) = 0.
2.5.3 Selfish Load Balancing: Congestion Game
As Int-CPF allocation decision is computationally expensive to solve, and does not de-
fine an incentive-compatible game, a natural alternative is to let selfish users decide for
themselves which BS to associate with.
When each MS can make individual association decision directly, instead of the multi-
cell resource allocation game as defined in Section 2.4.3, we have a single-association
game.
Formally, a single-association game is defined as (M,S,x), where
• M is the set of MS players.
• S =×mSm denotes the set of all possible ways in which players can pick strategies.
For each player m ∈ M, Sm denotes its own set of possible strategies, which corre-
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sponds to the subset of BSs with which it can associate. In particular, one strategy
bm ∈ Sm corresponds to the association of MS m with BS bm. A strategy profile
s ∈ S consists of the vector of each player’s selected strategy, i.e. s = (bm,m ∈M).
• Under the assumption that each BS implements individual proportional fairness
scheduling, and that all users have the same weight, the throughput xm received by





where Rmbm is the link data rate between MS m and its selected BS bm, and Nbm(s) is
the congestion level (number of associated users including MS m) of BS bm under
strategy profile s. Given the freedom to decide its own association, a player m has
no incentive to cheat about its link data rate, as doing so only decreases its actual
throughput.
For each player in the single-association game, its reward (in terms of allocated band-
width) of employing a certain strategy is affected only by the number of other players who
employ the same strategy (choosing the same BS to associate with), rather than who they
are. Thus, this game falls into the class of congestion games which is first introduced by
Rosenthal [92].
Rosenthal shows that if the cost (or reward) function is the same for all players choos-
ing the same strategy, then these games possess a rich structure, in particular they always
have a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. The term of “pure strategy” means each player
deterministically plays a single chosen strategy, instead of randomly picking among mul-
tiple strategies. This result follows from the existence of a potential function, which is a
real-valued function defined over the set of strategy profiles having the property that the
gain (or loss) of a player shifting to a new strategy is equal to the corresponding change
of the potential function.
The existence of an exact potential function implies the finite improvement property
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(FIP): Any sequence of strategy-tuples in which each strategy-tuple differs from the pre-
ceding one in only one coordinate (such a sequence is called a path), and the unique
deviator in each step strictly increases its payoff (an improvement path), is finite. The
first strategy-tuple of a path is called the initial point; the last one is called the terminal
point. Obviously, any maximal improvement path, an improvement path that cannot be
extended, is terminated by a Nash equilibrium.
Milchtaich [74] extends the definition of congestion game to allow player-specific
cost (or reward) functions, i.e. different players have different costs (or rewards) by choos-
ing the same strategy, and shows that even these games have a pure Nash equilibrium.
In our setting, different MSs have different wireless link data rate with the same BS,
thus the reward function is player-specific. However, the simple structure of the player-
specific reward function as defined in Equation 2.14 allows us to prove a stronger result
than Milchtaich.
More specifically, Theorem 2.4 shows that the single-association game possesses
the finite improvement property (FIP). To prove FIP, we define for every strategy profile






where Rmbm is the link data rate between MS m and its selected BS bm, and Nb(s) gives
the number of MSs allocated to a BS b under the strategy profile s. The potential function
is constructed such that the gain (or loss) of a player shifting to a new strategy is equal to
the corresponding change of the potential function, as shown in the proof below. Similar
construction has also been used by Gairing et al. [41] to analyze a delay minimization
congestion game with user-specific cost function.
Theorem 2.4 Single-association game possesses the finite improvement property.
Proof: Consider a selfish step s → s′ where a player m ∈ M switches from BS b to
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BS b′.
Φ(s′)−Φ(s) = (log(Rmb′)− log(Nb′(s)+1))− (log(Rmb)− log(Nb(s)))
= log(xm(s′))− log(xm(s)) (2.16)
Based on the result, we can formally describe the Selfish Load Balancing (SLB)
scheme as follows. Under SLB scheme, the common radio resource manager starts from
a feasible allocation decision, and greedily switches a MS to a BS that can improve its
throughput. Only one MS is switched at a time, thus when there are multiple MSs that
can improve by unilaterally switching association, SLB scheme selects one of them. The
iteration ends until a Nash equilibrium is reached, i.e., no user can unilaterally change its
association to achieve a higher throughput.
To make the presentation more concrete, we choose the following strategies when
implementing SLB scheme: (1) We use the popular heuristic of Strongest-Signal First
(SSF) allocation scheme as the initial allocation vector. In SSF allocation scheme, a MS
is associated with the BS that provides the strongest signal strength. The decision is made
regardless of the BS’s load. (2) Given a selected MS to switch, if there are multiple BSs
that can improve its allocated rate, we assign the selected MS to a BS that can increase its
allocated bandwidth by the largest percentage. Draws are settled randomly. (3) If there
are multiple MSs that can gain by unilaterally switching association, we select one of
them randomly. Note that, the result of Theorem 2.4 does not rely on the choices made
by our implementation. The convergence property holds for any strategy fitted into the
general framework.
Note that, there can be multiple Nash equilibria in the single-association game, and
SLB scheme can converge to any of them. For example, in Figure 2.6 (b), there are two
Nash equilibria. In the first equilibrium, MS m1 is associated to BS b1, and MS m2 is
associated to BS b2. In the second equilibrium, the associations are swapped. Individual
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MS can have significantly different bandwidth allocation under different Nash equilibria.
Note that although SLB scheme converges, it is not incentive compatible. For example,
MS m2 in Figure 2.6 (b) can hide its association with BS b2, so as to make the system
converge to the second equilibrium instead of the first one.
Despite the fact that it is not incentive compatible, SLB scheme is still a valuable
solution, as no MS can gain by unilaterally changing its association. In addition, our eval-
uation in Section 2.6 shows that SLB scheme converges quickly and performs close to Int-
CPF scheme. It remains an interesting research problem to design incentive-compatible
resource allocation schemes for single-association setting, such that MSs cannot gain by
cheating, while system can operate in a fair and efficient state.
2.6 Evaluation
2.6.1 Methodology
Our evaluation is based on a customized flow level simulator. The two metrics we con-
sider are arithmetic mean of per-user throughput values and geometric mean of per-user
throughput values. On one hand, arithmetic mean of per-user throughput values is the
sum of all MSs’ throughput divided by the number of MSs. It reflects the overall perfor-
mance of the system. Note that although a higher arithmetic mean implies higher aggre-
gated throughput for all MSs, resource sharing can be very unfair among them. Thus, we
look at the geometric mean of per-user throughput values, i.e., the nth root of the product
of all MSs’ throughput, where n is the number of MSs. Measure using geometric mean
presents a better trade-off between efficiency and fairness, as a single starved MS makes
the geometric mean equal to 0.
In Section 2.6.2, we first compare the performance of the three coordinated fairness
definitions, i.e., Coordinated Proportional Fairness, Coordinated Max-min Fairness, and
Coordinated Minimum Potential Delay Fairness. Section 2.6.3 compares the performance
of the following six schemes that are based on Proportional Fairness. For allocation
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schemes that can split a user’s flow among multiple interfaces, we consider:
• Coordinated Proportional Fairness (CPF) scheme, which is the optimal solution
for the convex programming problem as formulated in Equation 2.5. CPF scheme
gives the upper bound of the geometric mean of per-user throughput values.
• Uncoordinated Proportional Fairness (UPF) scheme, where a MS associates to
all neighboring BSs by simultaneously turning on multiple radio interfaces. This
is the Nash equilibrium for the association game as discussed in Chapter 1, and
represents a non-cooperative scenario where all users are selfish and the system is
uncoordinated.
For allocation schemes under single-association constraint that enforces each MS to
associate with only a single BS, we consider:
• Int-CPF scheme, which is the optimal solution for the integral optimization prob-
lem as formulated in Equation 2.13. The problem is proved to be NP hard. However,
for a relatively small number of BSs and constant weight, we are able to find the
optimal solution by iterating through all feasible congestion vector combinations to
find the optimal value among all resulted maximum weighted perfect k-matching
solutions. Note that, we assume that all MSs honestly report their channel states
and association information.
• Selfish Load Balancing (SLB) scheme, which starts from SSF allocation, and allows
user greedily switch BS to improve its own throughput. User switches in a random
order, and the switching user selects a BS allocating the highest rate. The iteration
ends until a Nash equilibrium is reached, i.e., no user can unilaterally change its as-
sociation to achieve a higher throughput. Theorem 2.4 establishes the convergence
of such a process.
• Strongest-Signal-First (SSF) scheme, which always associates a MS to the BS with
the strongest received signal strength, regardless of its load. SSF scheme is the
50
default association method for multiple radio access technologies, including Wi-Fi
networks.
• Least-Population-First (LPF) scheme, which always associates a MS to the BS
with the least number of associated MSs, regardless of the channel condition. LPF
scheme is a classical method for load balancing, especially in single-rate cellular
networks.
For fair comparison, we assume that each BS implements individual proportional
fairness scheduling for all schemes above, except for the case of CPF scheme, which
decides for each BS its allocation vector, thus does not necessarily follow the individual
proportional fairness scheduling.
As illustrated in Figure 2.7, our simulation is based on a 600m×600m torus topology
where 9 BSs are placed on a 3 by 3 grid, with the distance between two adjacent BSs set
to 200 meters. All BSs have identical transmission power and operate on non-interfering
channels. The maximum transmission range of a BS is set to 150 meters. The set B(m)
of BSs covering a MS m are determined from MS m’s location by examining whether
its distance to a BS is within 150 meters. We have conducted evaluations for two user
distributions:
Figure 2.7: A torus BS topology
• In uniform setting, users are distributed within the torus uniformly at random;
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• In hot spot setting, out of all MSs generated, κ = 90% are randomly positioned in a
circle-shape hot spot with the radius of 150 meters around the center of a selected
hot BS, as indicated by the shadow area in Figure 2.7.
The percentage of MSs covered by different number of overlapping BSs is shown in
Table 2.1 for the two settings. Both the average and 90% confidence interval (CI) are
shown.
Uniform Hot spot
Mean 90% CI Mean 90% CI
P(|B(m)|=1) 29.1% 17.8% - 40.4% 17.9% 8.9% - 26.7%
P(|B(m)|=2) 65.9% 53.3% - 77.8% 73.7% 64.4% - 84.4%
P(|B(m)|=3) 4.3% 0% - 8.9% 6.9% 0.2% - 13.3%
P(|B(m)|=4) 0.7% 0% - 2.2% 1.5% 0% - 4.4%
E[|B(m)|] 1.77 1.64 - 1.9 1.92 1.77 - 2.07
Table 2.1: Overlapping coverage statistics
The arrival of MSs follows a Poisson process, and the sojourn time of a MS in the
system follows an exponential distribution, both of which are assumed to be independent
of MSs’ allocated throughput for simplicity3. ρ = E[|M|]|B| is defined as the average number
of active MSs in the system divided by the number of BSs, with default value set to 5. We
use the log-normal shadowing propagation model to calculate the received signal strength
at MS from each of its adjacent BSs. Given the distance d < 150m between a MS m and
a BS b, the received signal power PdB(d) from b at m is calculated as:
PdB(d) = PdB(d0)−10βlog10 dd0 +Xσ (2.17)
where d0 = 10m is the reference distance, β = 3 is the path loss exponent, and Xσ
is a Normal random variable in dB having a standard deviation of σ = 12dB and zero
mean. The parameters are set to model the typical loss in an urban environment [89]. We
3We note that it takes longer time for a MS with lower bandwidth to download some given amount of
information, however, a MS with lower bandwidth also tends to download less amount of content. We leave
the study of MS behavior to future research.
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set the Signal Noise Ratio (dB) within reference distance to PdB(d0)−PdB(N0) = 35dB,
and use a threshold-based mapping as shown in Table 2.2 to determine the link data rate
accordingly. The selected values are commonly used in 802.11b network [5, 87, 110].
Table 2.3 shows the statistic of the link data rates among adjacent BS-MS pairs. Both the
average and 90% confidence interval (CI) of the probability are presented.
SNR < 3dB 3dB ≤ SNR < 8dB 8dB ≤ SNR < 15dB 15dB ≤ SNR
Rate 1Mbps 2Mbps 5.5Mbps 11Mbps
Table 2.2: Mapping between Signal Noise Ratio and link data rate
Uniform Hot spot
Mean 90% CI Mean 90% CI
P(R=1Mbps) 41.5% 32.5% -50.5% 44.3% 35.0% - 53.6%
P(R=2Mbps) 14.9% 7.9% - 21.9% 15.3% 8.5% - 22.1%
P(R=5.5Mbps) 18.6% 11.8% - 25.4% 18.4% 11.1% - 25.7%
P(R=11Mbps) 25.0% 16.3% - 33.7% 22.0% 14.0% - 30.0%
E[R] (Mbps) 4.48 3.67 - 5.29 4.18 3.48 - 4.88
Table 2.3: Link data rate statistics
2.6.2 Comparison of Various Coordinated Fairness Definitions
This section compares the performance of the three fairness definitions as discussed in
Section 2.3 when they are applied in a multi-cell environment, namely Coordinated Pro-
portional Fairness (CPF), Coordinated Max-min Fairness, and Coordinated Minimum
Potential Delay Fairness.
As shown in Table 2.4, for uniform setting, under the Coordinated Max-min Fair-
ness, the arithmetic mean of per-user throughput values is less than 30% of CPF, and
the geometric mean of per-user throughput values is around 40% of CPF. The per-user
throughput performance of the Coordinated Minimum Potential Delay Fairness allocation
scheme is intermediate between the Coordinated Max-min Fairness scheme and the Co-
ordinated Proportional Fairness scheme, in terms of both arithmetic mean and geometric
mean. Similar phenomenon is observed in hot spot setting as well.
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Uniform Hot spot
Arith. Mean Geo. Mean Arith. Mean Geo. Mean
Proportional average 1.26 0.89 0.93 0.5790% CI 1.06 - 1.46 0.67 - 1.11 0.64 - 1.22 0.45 - 0.69
Max-min average 0.36 0.36 0.23 0.2390% CI 0.26 - 0.46 0.26 - 0.46 0.17 - 0.29 0.17 - 0.29
Minimum
Potential Delay
average 0.89 0.79 0.68 0.51
90% CI 0.69 - 1.09 0.62 - 0.96 0.47 - 0.89 0.39 - 0.63
Table 2.4: Throughput (Mbps) comparison of different coordinated fairness definitions
2.6.3 Performance of Various Schemes
This section compares the performance of the six schemes adopting Proportional Fairness,
namely CPF, UPF, Int-CPF, SLB, SSF, and LPF.
Figure 2.8 (a) plots the per-user throughput values sorted in non-decreasing order
under the uniform setting, and Figure 2.8 (b) plots the result under the hot spot setting.
Figure 2.8 (c) and (d) provide a zoom-in view of MSs with low bandwidth allocation for
the two settings. Table 2.5 summarizes the arithmetic and geometric mean (and the 90%
confidence interval) of per-user throughput values under different schemes for the two
settings respectively.
Uniform Hot spot
Arith. Mean Geo. Mean Arith. Mean Geo. Mean
CPF average 1.26 0.89 0.93 0.5790% CI 1.06 - 1.46 0.67 - 1.11 0.64 - 1.22 0.45 - 0.69
UPF average 0.89 0.67 0.73 0.3990% CI 0.72 - 1.06 0.52 - 0.82 0.49 - 0.97 0.30 - 0.48
Int-CPF average 1.26 0.89 0.92 0.5690% CI 1.06 - 1.46 0.67 - 1.11 0.63 - 1.21 0.45 - 0.67
SLB average 1.26 0.89 0.92 0.5690% CI 1.06 - 1.46 0.67 - 1.11 0.63 - 1.21 0.45 - 0.67
SSF average 1.29 0.86 0.98 0.4590% CI 1.06 - 1.52 0.64 - 1.08 0.63 - 1.33 0.31 - 0.59
LPF average 1.02 0.63 0.75 0.4290% CI 0.78 - 1.26 0.48 - 0.78 0.49 - 1.01 0.31 - 0.53
































































































(d) Hot spot setting (Zoom-in)
Figure 2.8: Per-user throughput values sorted in non-decreasing order
Coordinated Proportional Fairness (CPF) scheme produces the optimal geometric
mean of per-user throughput values. This is as expected, because the objective function
of the optimization problem defined in Equation 2.5 can be transformed to the geomet-
ric mean of per-user throughput without affecting the solution. Note that, despite that
Strongest-Signal-First (SSF) scheme often allocates higher throughput than CPF scheme
to MSs with high bandwidth allocation (as shown in the right region of Figure 2.8 (a) and
(b)), it provides lower throughput for MSs with low bandwidth allocation, especially for
hot spot setting as shown in Figure 2.8 (d). Because of this unfairness, its geometric mean
of per-user throughput is lower than CPF scheme.
In contrast to CPF scheme, Uncoordinated Proportional Fairness (UPF) scheme per-
forms much worse, providing arithmetic/geometric mean of per-user throughput not only
lower than CPF scheme, but also inferior to all other schemes except for LPF scheme in
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some cases. This observation holds for both uniform and hot spot settings. The significant
performance gap between CPF and UPF strongly advocates the adoption of a coordinated
resource allocation approach for an integrated environment.
Among all allocation schemes for the single-association setting, Int-CPF scheme has
the optimal geometric mean of per-user throughput, which agrees with the optimization
problem defined in Equation 2.13. Its performance is close to CPF scheme under both
uniform setting and hot spot setting. For both settings, the coordinate-wise performance
gap between the two schemes is never greater than 3.5%, and is less than 1% for more
than 70% of MSs. Our result also shows that, Selfish Load Balancing (SLB) scheme
often has very close performance to Int-CPF scheme, thus to CPF scheme as well. For
around 65% of user distribution in uniform setting, SLB scheme and Int-CPF scheme
make the identical association decision. For 99% of user distributions, the performance
gap between the two schemes is less than 1%. Similar phenomenon is observed under hot
spot setting as well. In fact, such an approximation among SLB scheme, Int-CPF scheme,
and CPF scheme holds when we vary the traffic load and asymmetry, as demonstrated
later in Figure 2.9 and Figure 2.10. The only case that we observe obvious difference
between CPF scheme and the two single-association schemes is when the average number
of MSs per BS is very small (e.g. ≤ 3).
Based on this, we make the following observation: By using an (appropriate) single
radio per user, the system can largely achieve the performance when simultaneously using
multiple radios per user.
Among all six schemes, Strongest-Signal-First (SSF) scheme achieves the highest
arithmetic mean of per-user throughput. This is because SSF scheme greedily assigns
each MS to the BS providing the best channel condition. However, SSF scheme’s ge-
ometric mean of per-user throughput is lower than CPF scheme, Int-CPF scheme, and
SLB scheme, because a MS often associates to an overloaded BS that can only allocate a
small portion of its overall radio resource to serve the MS, thus provide low throughput
despite of the high link data rate between them. This situation is particularly common
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in hot spot setting. As shown in Figure 2.8 (d), for hot spot setting, nearly 15% of MSs
have throughput lower than 100 Kilobit per second (Kbps) under SSF scheme, compared
to less than 1% under CPF scheme. For the 15% of MSs with lowest bandwidth alloca-
tion, their throughput under SSF scheme is less than 60% of their throughput under CPF
scheme. Thus, SSF scheme can be unfair to a significant portion of users.
Least-Population-First (LPF) scheme often performs worst in terms of both arith-
metic and geometric mean of per-user throughput, implying that traditional load balancing






























Figure 2.9: Geometric mean of throughput (Mbps) over varying load
Figure 2.9 demonstrates different schemes’ performance under varying load in uni-
form setting. The performance of Int-CPF scheme and the performance of SLB scheme
are close to each other in all range of load. Further, the performance gap between they and
the CPF scheme reduces with increased traffic intensity. This is because both Int-CPF
scheme and SLB scheme allocate resource on a per MS basis. Hence, the larger the traf-
fic load, the finer the relative granularity of them. In fact, the only case that we observe
obvious difference between CPF scheme and the two single-association schemes is when
the average number of MSs per BS is very small (e.g. ≤ 3)
Figure 2.10 demonstrates the impact of asymmetric traffic distribution. The figure































Figure 2.10: Geometric mean of throughput (Mbps) over varying traffic distribution asym-
metry
scheme even under highly asymmetric traffic distribution. Such robustness is largely be-
cause both schemes take into account both network load and link data rate. In compari-
son, performance of SSF scheme deteriorates faster than all other schemes with increasing
traffic asymmetry, and LPF scheme performs better than UPF scheme under high traffic
asymmetry.























Figure 2.11: Convergence speed of SLB over varying load
Figure 2.11 shows the average number of steps required in the whole multi-cell sys-
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tem for SLB scheme to converge to a Nash equilibrium, starting from the SSF allocation.
As can be seen from the figure, SLB scheme converges quickly, and the number of steps
required grows linearly with the system load.
While SLB scheme takes strategic interactions among MSs into consideration, Int-
CPF scheme simply ignores them. Our evaluation shows that, up to 15% of decision
made by Int-CPF scheme is not a Nash equilibrium in the single-association game. More
specifically, there is at least one MS which can unilaterally change its association to gain
higher throughput from the network under Int-CPF allocation. As illustrated in Figure
2.6 (a), the user can cheat by hiding all of its adjacent BSs except for its desired BS, so as
to affect the Int-CPF resource allocation decision and increase its own bandwidth.
We observe that, in more than 30% of settings, there are multiple Nash equilibria in
the induced single-association game, meaning that there is at least one MS that can cheat
about its channel state to drive the system to the Nash equilibrium that it prefers.
2.7 Related Work
For cellular networks, schemes that dynamically balance loads among neighboring cells
have been proposed, including directed retry (DR) and directed handoff (DH) [34, 40, 52].
The proposed schemes take advantage of the fact that some MSs may be able to obtain
sufficient signal strength from multiple cells. With DR scheme, if a call finds its first-
attempted cell has no free channel, it will try for a free channel in any other cell that can
provide sufficient signal strength. The DH scheme takes this idea further, in that when a
cell has all or almost all of its channels in use, it may, using DH scheme, direct some of
its MSs to attempt handoff to an adjacent cell, with the goal to redistribute calls in heavily
loaded cells to lighter loaded cells. Both schemes can improve system performance. The
ratio of improvement depends on the percentage of MSs that can communicate with two
or more cells simultaneously, which has been reported to be as high as 30-45 percent by
Everitt [34]. However, these schemes are designed for voice calls, thus often assume that
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each call consumes a fixed amount of radio resource.
Bianchi and Tinnirello [14] observe that in wireless communication systems, effec-
tive transmission rate depends on the channel quality, thus admitted calls weight unevenly
in terms of effective resource consumption. They suggest using channel quality informa-
tion to drive load balancing mechanisms and propose two metrics, “Gross Load” and
“Packet Loss”, to quantify the information related to packet level retransmission load.
Using the proposed metrics, they determine the best cell to attach to, during handover
or new request arrival. Their simulation results show the superiority of their proposed
schemes with respect to the Least-Population-First (LPF) load-balancing scheme. Sang
et al. [95] propose a cross-layer framework to coordinate packet-level scheduling, flow-
level cell selection and handoff, and system-level loading balancing based on the load,
throughput, and channel measurements at different layers. In their proposed framework,
an opportunistic scheduling algorithm, the weighted Alpha-Rule, exploits multiuser diver-
sity gain in each cell independently, while providing minimum rate guarantees for MSs.
Each MS adapts to its channel dynamics and the load fluctuations in neighboring cells, in
accordance with MSs’ mobility and their arrivals or departures, by initiating load-aware
handoff and cell selection. The central server adjusts the scheduling parameters of each
cell to coordinate cells’ coverage, or cell breathing, by prompting distributed MS hand-
offs. Across the whole system, BSs and MSs constantly monitor their load, throughput,
or channel quality in order to facilitate the overall system coordination. However, both
works are designed for applications with stringent Quality of Service (QoS) requirement,
such as voice calls, which demand a specified amount of bandwidth. Instead, we focus
on elastic traffic, which can adapt to and make full use of various bandwidth allocation.
While the major metric to be optimized by Bianchi and Tinnirello [14] and Sang et al. [95]
is the blocking rate of MS (or more generally, the probability of not satisfying a user’s
QoS requirement), we aim at a globally fair and efficient allocation decision for elastic
traffics. Because of these differences, we cannot make direct comparison with them.
Bejerano et al. [10] consider the problem of achieving network-wide max-min fair-
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ness using association control for Wi-Fi networks. The max-min time fairness problem
they consider is intended for single-rate Wi-Fi networks only. Das et al. [27] consider
scheduling schemes in which scheduling decisions are made jointly for a cluster of cells,
thereby enhancing performance through both interference avoidance and dynamic load
balancing. They consider algorithms for two scenarios. In the first scenario, they assume
complete knowledge of the instantaneous channel quality information from each of the
BSs to MSs at the centralized scheduler. In the second scenario, they propose a two tier
scheduling strategy that assumes only the knowledge of the long-term channel conditions
at the centralized scheduler. They demonstrate that significant throughput gains can be
obtained in the case of asymmetric traffic distribution, whereas the gains in the symmetric
case are modest. Since the load balancing is achieved through centralized scheduling,
their scheme can adapt to time-varying traffic patterns dynamically. Both works adopt
max-min fairness as the criterion for bandwidth allocation. Max-min fairness is not suit-
able for elastic traffic in multi-rate wireless networks, because it can severely affect the
efficiency of the system as shown in Section 2.6.2.
In a parallel work with similar approach, Bu et al. [16] formulate the generalized
proportional fairness problem in third generation (3G) wireless data networks, by con-
sidering proportional fairness in a network-wide context. However, their formulation is
specific to HDR networks. In HDR networks, through a signaling channel, each user
feeds back its channel condition continuously to the proportional fairness scheduler at
the BS with which it associates. At each time slot, the scheduler at each BS schedules
the user with the largest weight where the weight is the link data rate of the user at the
current time slot divided by the average rate it has received so far. Instead, we consider
general wireless networks, which may consist of heterogeneous radio access technolo-
gies (thus, opportunistic scheduling may not be feasible at all). Li et al. [63] consider
the generalized proportional fairness problem in multi-rate Wi-Fi networks. Their tech-
nique is to intelligently associate users with APs to achieve optimal proportional fairness
in a network of APs. They propose two approximation algorithms with a constant worst-
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case guarantee for the NP-hard problem and demonstrate that the algorithms can obtain
both higher aggregate throughput and better fairness than the Strongest-Signal-First (SSF)
AP selection method in the 802.11b standard. The proposed schemes in both works are
essentially approximations to our Int-CPF scheme. Their evaluations also show that (ap-
proximated) Int-CPF scheme outperforms common heuristics like SSF scheme and LPF
scheme. However, both works do not consider the incentive compatibility issues.
Kauffmann et al. [53] also consider the fairness among MSs in a network-wide con-
text. They propose the use of minimum potential delay fairness [71] as the optimization
goal for user association control. Our simulation results in Section 2.6.2 show that this
criterion is intermediate between the max-min fairness and proportional fairness, in that
it results in a larger (smaller) overall throughput than max-min (proportional) fairness.
There are also works [57, 93] considering the use of multiple orthogonal channels in
wireless mesh networks, where each router is equipped with multiple radios. They focus
on the channel assignment algorithms to maximize throughput over multi-hop path. The
basic theme is to mitigate interference among contending links in a multi-hop path by
assigning them to different channels. In contrast, our work focuses on how to allocate the
bandwidth of the single-hop downlink from a BS to a MS. We only consider multi-mode
MS and assume that the capacity of BS is fixed. In our system model, the backhaul links
of BSs are over provisioned with different technologies (e.g. using wired networks), and
each BS operates orthogonally with each other. The techniques as proposed in multi-
channel wireless mesh networks can potentially be used to extend our existing works,
e.g., to model the situation that the backhual links of BSs use the same radio technology
as the BS-MS link.
2.8 Summary
This chapter studies the coordinated radio resource allocation problem for users that are
simultaneously covered by multiple overlapping cells using heterogeneous radio access
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technologies. We formulate the coordinated proportional fairness (CPF) resource allo-
cation criterion, based on which a globally fair and efficient allocation decision can be
easily computed. As CPF decision depends on the input from users, a selfish user may
manipulate its channel state report if doing so can increase its gain from the network. To
capture this phenomenon, we formulate the resource allocation process as a multi-cell re-
source allocation game, which is associated with a rule to calculate bandwidth allocation
outcome based on the input from the MS players. We prove that CPF allocation is incen-
tive compatible, in the sense that a user’s dominant strategy is to report its channel state
honestly. In practice, the single-association setting, where each MS is associated with a
single BS, is often desirable. We formulate the integral version of the CPF problem (Int-
CPF) and show that it is both computationally expensive and prone to user-manipulation.
Alternatively, we advocate the adoption of a Selfish Load Balancing (SLB) scheme, which
always leads to a Nash equilibrium, and often achieves performance near to the CPF allo-
cation. We use simulation to evaluate the performance of proposed schemes. The results
show that the proposed algorithms outperform popular heuristic approaches, by striking
a good balance between efficiency and fairness, while achieving load balancing among
component BSs.
Chapter 3
MobTorrent: Cooperative Access for
Delay-Tolerant Mobile Users
3.1 Introduction
For commuters and passengers on public buses, taxis or private vehicles, the most com-
mon and seamless way of getting Internet access is through the use of Wireless Wide Area
(Cellular) Networks, e.g., GPRS, 3G or HSDPA. The cellular radio can be plugged into
the end host (e.g. a laptop) or mounted on the vehicle from which shared network access
is provided to all passengers in the vehicle using an on-board Wi-Fi network 1. However,
even though performance of cellular networks has improved significantly over the years,
in particular with the deployment of HSDPA, the aggregate or per user data rate is still
limited by the need to provide ubiquitous coverage to a large number of users. In a re-
cent measurement, we observe around 300Kbps download speed from a vehicle (with a
1.5Mbps-limit subscription plan) using a local commercial HSDPA network.
Meanwhile, many cities around the world have witnessed large-scale deployment of
open Wi-Fi hotspots. In Singapore, more than 7000 free Wi-Fi access points (APs) have
1A shared on-board network enables passengers without cellular subscription (and interface) to access
Internet. In addition, a hand-held device can reduce its power consumption by using the short-range wireless
communication instead of connecting to a remote BS directly. Further, the powerful and well-positioned
vehicle antenna helps improve the wireless communication efficiency with the remote BS.
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Coverage P Ubiquitous Intermittent (e.g. 20%)
R×P 56Kbps - 14Mbps 200Kbps - 120Mbps
Table 3.1: Complementary characteristics of cellular networks and Wi-Fi networks
been deployed in the last few years in public open areas, shopping malls and commer-
cial buildings. On a smaller scale, in a measurement of our 150 hectares campus in Kent
Ridge, we can observe more than 2000 APs installed in 90 buildings. Strong Wi-Fi signal
can be received from about 25% of the 4km route traveled by the campus shuttle bus. Re-
cent research works [21, 84] have also demonstrated the feasibility of providing network
access via roadside APs.
On the other hand, Singapore being a city-state, has a dense deployment of public
buses. The largest public transport provider has a fleet of more than 2000 buses. Currently,
almost all buses are equipped with GPS and GPRS device. While the bandwidth provided
by GPRS is sufficient for its main application, an Automatic Vehicle Location (AVL)
system, it is too low to support Internet access service for passengers. Upgrading the
whole system to HSDPA is costly. With such a large number of open Wi-Fi APs available
already, providing network access to moving vehicles through roadside Wi-Fi APs offers
an alternative and complementary solution that can significantly increase the bandwidth
available to the vehicles.
Heterogeneous mobile broadband access architecture for commuters has been sug-
gested previously [17, 91], where multiple network interfaces (e.g. 3G and Wi-Fi) are
available and can be utilized simultaneously. The concept of Always Best Connection
(ABC) is often adopted, where mobile nodes automatically start to use the Wi-Fi network
as soon as an AP is in range. While Wi-Fi provides higher bandwidth at cheaper price,
it is only usable when the vehicle is in range and the contact duration is often short. In
comparison, although the speed of cellular link is lower, it has higher availability.
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Table 3.1 gives some example figures for the coverage and bandwidth of both net-
works. As described earlier in Chapter 1, both Wi-Fi and cellular networks keep evolving
to meet the increasing demands of mobile users. Meanwhile, other complementary / com-
petitive technologies, such as WiMax, are continuously introduced to the market. Despite
the fact that the various forms of technology advances (e.g. MIMO) can significantly in-
crease the network capacity, spectrum efficiency, and data rate, the tradeoff between cell
coverage (or communication distance) and factors such as spatial reuse, data rate, deploy-
ment cost is fundamental. Thus, we believe that there will be a long-term coexistence
of two forms of networks, i.e., high-bandwidth networks with intermittent coverage, and
lower-bandwidth networks with higher coverage, regardless of the actual technologies
being used. For example, the high-bandwidth intermittent network can be in the form
of femtocells using LTE (Long Term Evolution) technology instead of Wi-Fi hotspots as
discussed here.
Our work focuses on delay-tolerant applications, such as downloading some large
files (e.g. movie) from Internet. Thus, we are interested in the average throughput during a
long time period, in the scale of dozens of minutes, which can be expressed by multiplying
R, the bandwidth when in connection, with P, the probability of being connected. In
terms of this criterion, Wi-Fi networks provide comparable performance as, or even higher
performance than cellular networks. For example, a Wi-Fi contact lasting 10 seconds (a
typical contact length in our measurement on a campus bus testbed) with an average data
rate of 11Mbps can transfer more than 13MegaByte of data (the typical size of a 5-minute
movie clip or four songs in mp3 format). In comparison, it takes a cellular network with
300Kbps bandwidth more than 5 minutes to complete the same transfer. In addition, Wi-
Fi networks are generally cheaper than cellular networks. The much larger number of
Wi-Fi APs compared to cellular BSs makes Wi-Fi networks scale better with the number
of users in terms of the network capacity.
In order to fully exploit the available high-bandwidth but intermittent contacts, we
propose MobTorrent [25], an on-demand, user-driven framework designed to optimize
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performance for vehicular network. The approach taken by MobTorrent is different from
existing works in that we use the cellular network mainly as a control channel. We also
assume that the mobility information can be predicted with high accuracy using AVL
system and history. In this framework, a mobile client, instead of waiting for contact with
the AP, uses the cellular radio (e.g. GPRS) to inform one (or multiple) selected AP(s) to
prefetch the content. The prefetched data are then replicated on the mobile helpers, and
further propagated by the latter in a store-carry-forward, i.e., Delay-Tolerant Network
(DTN) routing fashion. As a result, instead of limiting high-speed data transfers to a few
short contact periods with the selected APs, high-speed transfers among vehicles can be
opportunistically exploited.
While MobTorrent exploits prefetching and replication, the key component is the
scheduling algorithm, which replicates the prefetched data by taking into account lo-
cations of the mobile nodes and existing level of data replication. The objective is to
maximize the total amount of data transferred and the average transfer rate to the mobile
clients.
In this work, we first characterize the performance limits of opportunistic mobile for-
warding through a simple scenario using only one AP. The insight gained is then used to
design the scheduling scheme for inter-vehicle transmission. In the evaluation, we use
testbed measurement to verify the benefit of prefetching and use trace-driven simulation
to evaluate performance of scheduling. Our results show that MobTorrent provides sub-
stantial improvement over existing architecture and often performs close to what can be
achieved by an off-line optimal scheduler. In case of multiple APs, our evaluation results
show that MobTorrent is robust in a variety of settings.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we describe the
architecture of MobTorrent. In Section 3.3, we discuss scheduling issues and analyze the
performance gain. In Section 3.4, we evaluate the performance of MobTorrent. In Section




In order to deploy MobTorrent, we require wide adoption of GPS devices on vehicles
(e.g., Japan’s vehicle navigation system installation rate is estimated to be as high as 59%,
while Europe and the United States are around 25% [90]). In addition, each vehicle must
be equipped with both Wi-Fi interface and cellular interface. We use the cellular network
mainly as a control channel, so the existing low-bandwidth GPRS suffices. Vehicles are
expected to have an estimation of their travel route. This can be obtained from historical
values or based on locations and digital street maps. We believe that all of these are
reasonable requirements, in particular, for public buses and vehicles that travel on regular
routes.















Figure 3.1: MobTorrent framework
• Mobile Clients are vehicles that require help to download data from data store /
web servers through Internet.
• Road-side APs are static Wi-Fi access points reachable from the road. They have
Internet backhaul, and offer their services to mobile clients. They can be residen-
tial gateways in apartments or installed as part of a vehicle network infrastructure
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that is placed along the road, say at bus stops, taxi stands, or traffic lights. Note
that the backhaul downlink bandwidth to these APs can be lower than the wireless
bandwidth available on the 802.11 link. For example, in a residential home, the
downlink speed could be a few Mbps or less, whereas the average Wi-Fi bandwidth
can be over 20Mbps for 802.11g and much higher for 802.11n.
• AP Directory Servers provide location information on available roadside APs.
There are a number of open Wi-Fi AP locators available on the web already, includ-
ing http://www.openwifispots.com, http://www.fon.com, and http://www.whisher.com.
The locations of participating APs need to be in the form of coordinates given in
longitude and latitude, which can be easily found even without GPS by using digital
street maps. Depending on the system requirements, these servers can also maintain
information related to the AP’s reputation and performance. For scalability purpose,
it is likely that the servers are clustered into different geographical regions.
• Mobile Helpers are idle vehicles willing to offer their bandwidth to help peer ve-
hicles with downloading demand.
3.2.2 Control and Data Flow
In this section, we describe a typical operation in MobTorrent data transfer, as illustrated
in Figure 3.2.
Initially, a mobile client wants to download a (sufficiently large) file. Note that small
requests are assigned to the always-on cellular link to minimize their delay. By down-
loading large files via Wi-Fi, the cellular link can be less congested, which benefits the
small requests too. The mobile, with its location known through a GPS device, acquires
the list of APs that are along its travel path. Based on a number of parameters (file size,
location of AP, estimated travel time to the AP), the node selects a set of APs and contacts
them through its cellular interface. For example, as shown in Figure 3.2, 2 data blocks are
needed, while AP A1 and A2 are selected.
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Figure 3.2: MobTorrent data downloading process
At time t1, the mobile client requests A1 to prefetch block 1 and A2 to prefetch block
2, and the two APs begin to download the respective blocks.
At time t2, the blocks are downloaded to the corresponding APs and cached locally.
At time t3, the mobile client travels within the range of A1 and downloads block 1
from A1. At the same time, the mobile helper, a second bus moving towards the mobile
node, enters the coverage of A2. A2 sends block 2 to the mobile helper.
At time t4, the mobile client and the mobile helper meet at some point between A1
and A2. The mobile helper transfers block 2 to the mobile client, thus completing the
transfer even before the mobile client reaches A2.
In order to efficiently orchestrate the whole downloading process, two questions need
to be answered: (1) How much data should an AP prefetch? (2) How to relay the data to
a client via mobile helpers, so that the amount is maximized and the delay is minimized?
We answer these questions in the next section.
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3.3 Scheduling in MobTorrent
3.3.1 Roles and Functions of Different Mobile Helpers
Before presenting the scheduling algorithm in MobTorrent, we first draw insight from how
opportunistic relay should work in a simple mobility model on a 2-way street. This model
abstracts the major properties for some typical settings, such as commuters on highway,
and public buses with fixed routes within a city.
We consider a relatively sparse vehicle network, where the probability of forming
a contemporaneous multi-hop path is negligible, so single hop forward in each contact
opportunity is the main form of data transfer. Vehicles are assumed to move on a long,
2-way street without divergence in the path. A vehicle moves in one of the two directions
(LEFT or RIGHT) on the road and it never changes its direction. In addition, there is no
overtaking among the vehicles moving in the same direction. We focus on the case of a
single AP in the model.
We define an opportunistic contact as the time period that two peers get in communi-
cation range, and can exchange data with each other directly. To fully describe a contact
between two nodes, we need to record the contact start time and how long it lasts, as well
as the varying link data rate available at each time point during this interval. To keep our
discussion succinct, we define the notation of contact capacity, which is the amount of
data that can be exchanged in a contact, i.e. the product of the average data rate and the
length of the contact. Note that the two directions of transfer processes compete for the
same contact duration, so the contact capacity limits the sum of the volumes that can flow
in the two directions. We denote the start time of the contact period as the contact time.
As we assume that the network is relatively sparse, and a single node’s different contacts
do not overlap with each other, the start time of the contact is sufficient for the purpose of
ordering the contacts for a single node according to the sequence they happen.
Given the time and the client’s location when the request is generated, we can cate-
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Figure 3.3: Classes of helpers
positions (relative to the client and the AP) as shown in Figure 3.3:
• Direct relay: mobile nodes that move towards the client and meet the AP after the
request is generated but before they meet the client. As the name suggests, a direct
relay can get data from the AP, carry it, and directly send to the client.
• Forerunner: mobile nodes that move in the same direction as the client and meet
the AP after the request is generated but before the client meets the AP.
• Indirect relay: mobile nodes that move towards the client and meet the client
before they meet the AP. If every node moves at the same velocity, the condition
to distinguish between direct relay and indirect relay is to compare its distance to
AP, denoted as dr, with the distance d between client and AP at the same time. As
shown in Figure 3.3, if dr ≤ d, the relay is a direct relay, otherwise, it is an indirect
relay. Note that when an indirect relay meets the AP, there is no need for the AP
to send data to it, as it will not meet the client or any node that will meet the client
from then on.
The client attaches its mobility trajectory in the request, thus each node can determine
its role for the given request according to its local information about its own mobility
trajectory. They also learn about the mobility trajectory and roles of other helpers through
inter-vehicle contacts. Further details are provided later in Section 3.3.4.
The set of direct relays, forerunners, and indirect relays are denoted as D,F, I respec-
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(c) Performance of schemes
Figure 3.4: A simple two-way street example
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• Early node: mobile nodes that have moved past the AP before the request is gener-
ated. They cannot help the data delivery because they cannot receive data directly
from the AP, or from any vehicle carrying the desired data.
• Late node: mobile nodes that are always behind the client. They cannot help the
data delivery because they cannot send data directly to the client, or to any mobile
node that will meet the client after meeting them.
An example is given in Figure 3.4 (a), which shows the traces of vehicles and their
contacts along the time axis. As explained above, we succinctly denote a contact using 4
parameters, namely {node1, node2, contact time, contact capacity}. As shown in Figure
3.4 (a), at time t1, AP (A) meets the first direct relay (D1) (as their trace intersects),
with contact capacity 2, which is the number marked at the point of intersection. This
contact can be represented as: {A,D1, t1,2}. Similarly, we can write down the rest of
contacts from the figure in their sequence as: {D1,F1, t2,1}; {A,F1, t3,2}; {D1,C, t4,1};
{F1, I1, t5,3}; {C,A, t6,2}; {I1,C, t7,3}.
3.3.2 Performance Limits
In this section, we derive the performance limits by examining an off-line scheduler,
which is assumed to have the information about the complete contact trace through some
oracle.
The two performance metrics of interest are (1) the maximum amount of data sent by
the AP that reaches the client eventually, and (2) the minimum delay to deliver a given
amount of data. We assume that there is sufficient buffer on all nodes to accommodate
packets in transfer, and the only bottleneck is the contact capacity constraint between
nodes.
Denote the contact time and contact capacity between node i and node j by t ij and C ij
respectively. t ij and C ij are subject to the random fluctuations like traffic jams and network
congestion. In practice, such information is only revealed on-line. Thus, the performance
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of an off-line optimal scheduler serves as an upper bound for what can be achieved by an
on-line scheduling scheme. We consider the uncertainties in t ij and C ij as resolved in the
following discussions of off-line scheduling performance.
Maximum Data Transfer from AP to Client
The maximum amount of data C that the AP (denoted as node A) can push to the network
and stand a chance to reach client (denoted as node C) is:









C is the sum of three parts: C AC is the amount that can be transferred directly to the
client by the AP, ∑i∈D C Ai is the amount that can be transferred to all direct relays (thus
stand a chance to reach the client) by the AP, and ∑ j∈F C Aj is the amount that can be
transferred to all forerunners by the AP. Sending data to the rest of nodes (the indirect
relay and late nodes) is useless. Note that, under our mobility model, all data stored in
forerunner will eventually reach client, as we assume that there is an infinite flow of relays
from the opposite direction. However, if a direct relay cannot replicate all of its data to
the client or to some forerunner in time, the unfinished data will become lost permanently
when the direct relay travels past the client. Thus, the capacity estimated in Equation
(3.1) often cannot be achieved. To minimize such loss, the direct relay replicates its data
to forerunner as soon as possible, so that even if it cannot send the data to the client by
itself, the data can still be forwarded later via forerunner and other relays. Based on this
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The second part in Equation 3.2, i.e., ∑i∈D min(C Ai ,C iC + ∑t ji >tAi , j∈F C
i
j) gives the
amount of data that direct relays can get from the AP and replicate to other nodes (in-
cluding the client and forerunners). As to be shown later, a 4-hop scheme can achieve the
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capacity in Equation 3.2. Thus, the bound is tight.
Minimum Delay from AP to Client
In terms of the minimum delay to deliver a set of n blocks, a lower bound can be ob-
tained by assuming that all contacts between the client and a direct or indirect relay are
fully utilized. However, this bound is also loose because it is possible that some contact
capacity between the client and a relay cannot be fully utilized if the relay does not carry
enough new data. For example, a direct relay may only get 5MB of data from the AP, then
immediately meet the client. If its contact capacity with the client is 10MB, half of the
contact capacity between the direct relay and the client is wasted, as there is no new data
to be transferred.
Given a contact trace, in order to obtain a tight bound for the delay, we observe that
it is possible to find the maximum amount of data that can reach client, by modelling it
as a maximum network flow problem. Hence, we can perform an off-line computation
to characterize the performance. Given a sequence of contacts {c1,c2, ...cn} between the
different nodes starting from the request generation time, the graph G = (V,E) for the
network flow problem is constructed in the following way.
• Vertices There is one vertex A representing the AP, and another vertex C represent-
ing the client. They are the source and destination of the network flow problem.
For each of the non-client vehicle v, if it has n contacts in the trace, we split it into
n vertices, v1 to vn. These constitute all vertices in graph G. Note that, given a
contact trace, each node’s contacts, which are assumed non-overlapping with each
other, can be ordered according to their contact times. We say a contact is the ith
contact of a node, if it represents the contact with the ith node encountered by the
considered node in the given contact trace.
• Edges For each contact, we use one (or two) directed edge(s) to represent it in the
graph. For the contact between the AP and the client, we add a directed edge from A
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to C. For the contact between the AP and a mobile helper v, if this contact is the ith
contact of the helper, we add a directed edge from A to vi. For the contact between
the client and a mobile helper v, if this contact is the ith contact of the helper, we
add a directed edge from vi to C. A single directed edge suffices because only the
specified direction is useful to maximize the network flow from A to C. During the
contact, the data flow should always follow the direction of the edge. For each edge
added, the edge capacity is set to the corresponding contact capacity.
For a contact between two mobile helpers u and v, if this contact is the ith contact
for vehicle u, and jth contact for vehicle v, we add a pair of directed edges between
ui and v j, as both of the two directions may help to maximize the network flow.
These two edges should share the same contact capacity (denoted as setting S1).
However, as detailed below, we can set the capacity of both (instead of the sum of
both) to the contact capacity (denoted as setting S2) without affecting the value of
maximum flow. Finally, we add directed edge with unlimited capacity from ui to
ui+1, for every node u and valid i. These directed edges represent the fact that a
vehicle can carry the data it received from a previous contact to the next contact. A
finite capacity for this type of edge can be used to model buffer limit if required.
We can show that S1 and S2 have identical maximum flow solution in the following
way. First, the optimal solution of S2 is no worse than S1, as every feasible solution
of S1 is also a feasible solution of S2. Second, given an optimal solution in S2,
if there are flows over a pair of edges, it can be reduced to a solution with the
same maximum flow using at most one of the edges, by offsetting the flows in the
opposite directions with each other until one of them becomes 0. By repeating the
above process for all pairs of edges, we can get a feasible solution in S1. Thus, S2’s
solution is no better than S1.
For example, the contact trace as depicted in Figure 3.4 (a) will result in a network
flow graph as shown in Figure 3.4 (b). Given the above formulation, the minimum delay
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for delivering a given amount of data can be calculated efficiently.
With the performance limits known, we next examine several typical schemes starting
from the simplest.
3.3.3 Comparison of Scheduling Schemes
Figure 3.4 (c) shows the volume of data that can reach the client using different schemes,
under Figure 3.4 (a)’s setting.
1-hop scheme
The AP only transfers directly to the client during their contact. Volume of data delivered
is C1−hop = C AC . In the example, the client can get 2 blocks of data from the AP directly.
2-hop scheme
In this scheme, the AP sends data to the client and direct relays. A direct relay keeps
the data until it meets the client and sends the data to the client. The amount of data
transferred by a direct relay (i) from the AP to the client is the minimum of the two contact
capacities, C Ai and C iC. Therefore, C2−hop = C AC +∑i∈D min(C Ai ,C iC). In the example, the
client can get 1 additional block of data from the direct relay D1. Note that another block
sent to D1 by the AP is lost due to the low contact capacity between D1 and the client.
3-hop scheme
In this scheme, AP sends data to the client, direct relays and forerunners. Although fore-
runners cannot send directly to the client, they can send their data via direct relay or
indirect relay (thus 3 hops). Under our assumption, forerunners can meet enough relays
to dump its data to the client, thus all data sent to forerunners can reach the client eventu-
ally. Therefore, C3−hop = C AC +∑i∈D min(C Ai ,C iC)+∑ j∈F C Aj . In the example, the client
can get 2 additional data blocks from indirect relay I1, which itself gets the data from F1.
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However, the 2nd block carried by D1 is still lost. Minimizing the loss of directed relay
requires at least a 4-hop delivery.
4-hop scheme
In this scheme, a direct relay saves its data as soon (and as much) as possible to forerun-
ners before meeting the client. This feature minimizes loss since forerunners can always
transfer its data via indirect relay later. 4-hop delivery achieves the capacity as character-
ized in Equation 3.2. In the example, the missing block from 3-hop scheme reaches the


















Figure 3.5: Scheduling to minimize delay
However, 4-hop is not yet optimal to minimize the delivery delay. Consider the situ-
ation as shown in Figure 3.5. The minimum delay to deliver the 1 unit of data is through
5 hops, i.e., the contact of {A,F1}, {F1, I1}, {I1,F2}, {F2, I2}, {I2,C}. Replication among
forerunners (F1 and F2) is necessary to minimize the delay. Note that, the replication
can only be carried among forerunners in one direction, i.e., from a forerunner to another
forerunner moving behind it. For example, data can be replicated from forerunner F1 to
forerunner F2, but not vice-versa.
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3.3.4 MobTorrent Scheduling
Based on observations from the previous section, we design the scheduling algorithm of
MobTorrent as follows:
• Meta data: MobTorrent keeps the following meta information with each data block
k at each relevant node:
1. Reqk: request id2;
2. bk: block id;
3. Ackk: whether this block has reached the client;
4. rk: a (local) estimation of the persistent replication level of this block in the
whole system, i.e. the number of mobile helpers that currently possess this
block;
5. IDk: the ID of the forerunner that travels in the most front among all forerun-
ners that possess this block.
• First hop: We assume that the AP always has new data to be forwarded to the
client. When a data block k is sent to a forerunner Fj, the latter marks rk = 1 and
IDk = Fj. When a data block k is sent to a direct relay, the latter marks rk = 0, and
IDk = 0. Replication on direct relay is not counted as a persistent replication.
• Role determination Each mobile helper can determine its role (whether it is a
direct relay, forerunner, indirect relay, or early/late node), based on the request
information about the client’s mobility trajectory and location of selected AP(s), as
well as its own mobility trajectory. The request information is propagated to mobile
helpers together with the propagation of data, whereas the node’s own mobility
trajectory is predicted locally. In addition, each forerunner appends its mobility
2For each request it currently serves, a helper records information including the client id and its mobility
trajectory, the request start time and deadline, the information about selected AP(s) and mobile helpers for
this request, etc..
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trajectory to the request information before propagating it to the next hop, so that
other nodes can calculate the relative locations of multiple forerunners locally.
• Meta data reconciliation: When two vehicles A and B meet, they will first ex-
change their meta data. Suppose the replication level estimation of block k is rAk
at A, and rBk at B. After the exchange, both of them will set their estimation to
max(rAk ,r
B
k ). For all the following transmissions within this contact, the replication
level of the transmitted block will be updated to the same new value at both sides.
AckAk = AckBk = AckAk ∨AckBk .
• Priority calculation: Priority is calculated for each block to determine its order
of transmission in the given contact. Suppose that the set of undelivered blocks
(with Ack = f alse) at A is SA, and the set of undelivered blocks at B is SB. After
the exchange, they calculate SA−SB and SB−SA, which are the candidate set to be
sent to each other. The set of undelivered blocks is updated as described later in the
paragraph of Last hop. A node sorts its candidate blocks according to replication
levels, giving the highest priority to the block with the lowest level of replication.
The level of replication is calculated locally by the two nodes in contact according
to the rules described later in the paragraph of Minimize loss, Maximize rate, and
Increase replication level. Data block with higher priority is transferred first, thus
has a higher chance to be replicated under the uncertainty of contact capacity. In
case of ties, the blocks are sorted by IDk. Therefore, given a block i replicated
at forerunner F , another block j that is not replicated at any forerunner travelling
in front of F (including F itself) has a higher priority than block i. This is because
replication can happen only among forerunners in the direction reverse to their mov-
ing direction. Thus, in a long term, blocks from forerunner travelling in front have
more opportunities to be replicated. Given a selected transfer direction among the
contact nodes, data transmission is performed according to the priority calculated.
Between two mobile helpers, the following three rules, i.e. minimize loss, maximize
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rate, and increase replication level, take action in order to specify the scheduling of
transmission directions.
• Minimize loss: If one party is a direct relay, it may carry blocks with ri = 0, i.e.,
the data blocks that the relay received directly from the AP and have not yet been
sent to any other node. Whenever such a block exists, transfer opportunity is given
to the direct relay to minimize loss. After the transmission, both parties set the
replication level of the block to 1, and set the ID to the ID of the current forerunner.
• Maximize rate: After the loss-minimizing step is done, this rule ensures that a
direct or indirect relay has enough new data so that its contact capacity with the
client can be fully used. Based on the contact capacity statistic between the client
and relays, a threshold γ is selected to determine whether the amount of data carried
by a relay is sufficient. We set γ as two times the expected contact capacity between
vehicles. While this threshold is not reached yet, transfer opportunity is given to the
forerunner. After the transmission, the replication level of the block is increased by
a value of α < 1, to capture the fact that it is replicated onto the relay. This value is
less than one because unlike replication on the forerunner, the relay can go past the
client without replicating this data block out and this particular copy is lost. As it is
difficult to determine the “best” value for α, we simply set it to 0.5. Our simulation
results show that performance does not change much when this value is varied.
• Increase replication level: Once the threshold for new data block is reached, data
exchange happens in both directions. Remained candidate blocks from both sides
are merged into a single priority queue sorted by replication level and ID. In case of
ties, data stored on the direct or indirect relay is given higher priority, as transferring
it will increase the replication level by 1, whereas the transfer at the other direction
will only increase the replication level by α.
• Last hop: When the direct or indirect relay meets the client, blocks are transferred
from the relay to the client according to their priorities. When the contact finishes,
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the client uses its cellular interface as a control channel to update APs and all fore-
runners about new blocks that it has just received. Note that the client does not need
to update direct and indirect relays, as they will be updated when they get contact
with forerunners. Once past the client, a relay removes all of its data for the client
(even those that have not been delivered yet), as there is no more opportunity to
deliver them.
The intuition behind the scheduling scheme can be explained as follows. When few
data blocks have been delivered, the relays often have sufficient “new” data to fully utilize
the contact capacity with the client. However, as more blocks are delivered, it becomes
harder for the relay to transfer sufficient undelivered data to the client if its contact ca-
pacity with forerunners does not match up well with the amount of undelivered data on
them. As a result, data delivery rate to the client decreases as more blocks are delivered.
MobTorrent scheduling scheme is designed such that as more blocks are delivered, the
replication level of the undelivered data increases. In this way, data delivery rate can be
maintained at a high level till all blocks are delivered.
Scheduling decisions in MobTorrent have some similarity in the spirit to the schedul-
ing decisions made in existing DTN routing protocols, e.g., MaxProp [18] and RAPID [7].
However, in MobTorrent, the information of direction and relative position is fully ex-
ploited to optimize performance.
In the model presented, we have assumed that there is no overtaking and nodes do
not leave the system. The MobTorrent system will work in the presence of overtaking
and path divergence. The impact of these factors will be evaluated using simulation in the
next section.
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Figure 3.6: A snapshot of NUS bus monitoring system
3.4 Performance Evaluation
3.4.1 Testbed Configuration
We build a simple MobTorrent prototype to evaluate its performance in a real environ-
ment. We equipped 16 campus buses with an on-board LinkSys WRT54GL router as
mobile clients. These clients run on the OpenWRT operating system. Each client is fixed
at a bracket in front of the driver, and draws power from the bus. When the bus is moving,
the client scans and attempts to associate to the campus Wi-Fi network. Once it suc-
cessfully associates with an AP, the client uses a pre-stored map to figure out the valid
IP address that it can use (the school APs along the route belong to several different IP
subnets). We pre-load the mapping between AP and IP subnet on all clients to reduce the
overhead of IP address acquisition. Similar optimization can be done on MobTorrent, as
the AP and the client can exchange IP and authentication information via cellular network
before they meet. Live bus tracking is available at http://mobtorrent.ddns.comp.nus.edu.sg/.
Figure 3.6 gives a snapshot of the system. The campus shuttle buses run in a circle from
both directions around the Kent Ridge campus. The average time for a bus to complete
the 4km route is about 20 minutes. Over 120,000 contact statistics are collected from
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File Approach Time Speed Ratio
A pdf file Without prefetching 3.2s 25KBps 68%
(80KB) With prefetching 0.33s 240KBps 98%
OpenWRT firmware Without prefetching 12s 111KBps 45%
(1513KB) With prefetching 1.77s 853KBps 78%
A 3 minute video clip Without prefetching 33s 201.5KBps 16%
(6.5MB) With prefetching 6.7s 993KBps 59%
Table 3.2: Download performance with and without prefetching
more than 1,300 driving hours over a 2 month period. The mean bus-AP contact duration
is around 15s with mean contact capacity around 4.5MB, and the mean bus-bus contact
duration is around 11s with the mean contact capacity around 3.2MB.
The evaluation has two parts. First, we evaluate the benefits of prefetching on the
testbed. Next, we evaluate the benefits of using mobile helpers.
3.4.2 Benefits of Pre-fetching
When a client sends its request to an AP through cellular network before contact, the
AP prefetches the data and stores it locally. In order to evaluate the potential gain, the
client is programmed to download several selected files via the Wi-Fi network. In the
measurement, there were 100 attempts to download each of these files over the Wi-Fi
network when the clients were within range of a campus AP. Three of the selected files
are shown in Table 3.2 together with the average downloading duration, downloading
speed, and the downloading completion ratio. The completion ratio is computed as the
number of times the files were completely transferred in a single AP-bus contact duration
over the total number of attempts. Note that, as the file size increases, it becomes less
likely that the file can be downloaded successfully in a single attempt. For the largest file
of 6.5MB, complete downloading from Internet without prefetching is possible only 1 in
6 attempts.
For comparison, the files are stored on the APs in advance and downloaded to the
mobile node on request. As shown in Table 3.2, there is a significant improvement of
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Link 25% 50% 75% 95%
End-to-end Internet path 37.6 81.0 160.5 330.6
One hop Wi-Fi Link 2.347 2.742 4.668 26.129
Table 3.3: RTT measurement (ms)
downloading performance for files of all sizes. Note that such improvement is possible
for all downloads made using advance requests, independent of the scheduling algorithm.
A closer look at the source of performance gain reveals that, for the first file with a
small size (80KB), the downloading duration difference is mainly due to the decrease in
RTT (round trip time). Table 3.3 shows the measured RTT distribution for end-to-end
wired Internet Links and the local Wi-Fi link. The end-to-end wired Internet Link RTT
is obtained from the Internet End-to-end performance Measurement (IEPM) with 413
different pairs of nodes across several continents. The local RTT is measured using ARP
packets sent from the client box to the AP. ARP is used because many APs on campus do
not response to ping but to ARP request. The measurement shows that the RTT of a local
Wi-Fi link is about one magnitude shorter than a typical RTT over Internet. Shorter RTT
allows TCP to increase its congestion window at a faster rate, which helps to shorten the
downloading time for short files. For the larger files, the speed difference is also due to the
avoidance of bottlenecks in the Internet. Though the download rate constraint from the
server can be alleviated by using parallel downloads, the constraint in the local backhaul
link (such as ADSL, cable, or wireless mesh) cannot be bypassed.
3.4.3 Benefits of Scheduling
We compare performance of the following schemes.
1. 1-hop: The AP only sends data directly to the client. This serves as the baseline for
performance comparison.
2. Random: A scheduling scheme that employs random replications between peers.
When both sides have innovative data for each other (i.e., the data block that the
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other side does not possess yet), one side is randomly selected to transfer a ran-
domly selected innovative data block.
3. Greedy: A scheduling scheme that greedily replicates data in the order of their ex-
pected deductions in the delay to reach the client, following the design of RAPID [7].
The data delivery delay is determined according to the expected time the relay meets
the client. For example, in a contact between a forerunner and a direct relay, transfer
priority is always given to the direction from the forerunner to the direct relay.
4. MobTorrent: As described in Section 3.3.4.
5. Off-line: A download mechanism that has off-line knowledge of contacts, and de-
cides scheduling according to the solution of the network flow problem. This serves
as the upper bound for achievable performance.
Note that, because of the significant difference in settings and assumptions, we can-
not directly compare MobTorrent with existing related works, including PROPHET [68],
Spray and Wait [99], MV routing [19], MaxProp [18], and RAPID [7]. For example, in
our testbed, if two nodes just meet each other, the probability that they will meet again
in recent future is almost 0. However, all existing schemes tend to assign a higher meet-
ing probability to this pair of nodes. For a fair comparison, we implement the Random
scheme and Greedy scheme such that, block is never replicated to a node which has no
chance to deliver it to the client, while still keeping their original salient features. The
Random scheme and Greedy scheme are selected to demonstrate that the heuristics in-
corporated in MobTorrent outperform the common practice used in existing DTN routing
protocols.
Performance with Single AP and Single client
In this scenario, there is only one AP located on a 2-way street with an infinite flow of
































































































Figure 3.7: Performance under single-AP, single-client, ideal two-way street setting
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collected from our testbed. 100 rounds of simulation are run, and the average is presented
in Figure 3.7 (a). To make the averaging meaningful, for each run, the time and volume is
normalized so that the off-line scheme reaches an optimal volume capacity of 100 at time
clock 100. In the simulation, the average number of forerunners is 5.
As shown in the figure, MobTorrent is close to off-line scheme in terms of both the
volume of data delivered and the delay to deliver data. At time clock 100, MobTorrent,
random, greedy and 1-hop schemes deliver 91%, 78%, 71% and 11% of all data respec-
tively.
The random scheme delivers most of the data eventually, but takes much longer than
MobTorrent, due to the coupon collection phenomenon where new data are difficult to
locate towards the end. MobTorrent alleviates such effect by giving priority to data blocks
located only at forerunners travelling behind other forerunners. The greedy scheme does
not reach the volume capacity (with a 20% gap) because the greedy transfer of data from
a forerunner to a direct relay prevents the latter from replicating its data into the network.
As expected, the 1-hop scheme only achieves a small fraction of the available capacity.
Next, we evaluate the impact of varying number of forerunners. The average number
of direct relays is the same as the average number of forerunners. We define the average
data rate as the ratio of the total data volume delivered and the time taken to deliver the
last packet (lost packets are ignored). Figure 3.7 (b) and (c) show that when the number
of forerunners (and hence helpers) increases, both the average data rate and the total
volume of data delivered increase. In terms of the average data rate, the rate of increase
for MobTorrent tracks the off-line scheme fairly well, whereas the random and greedy
schemes improve at a slower rate. 1-hop scheme does not benefit from mobile helpers at
all.
Performance with Multiple APs and Multiple clients
We use the mobility and contact trace collected from the testbed to drive the simulation.


















































































(c) Impact of path divergence
Figure 3.8: Performance under multi-AP, multi-client, testbed trace setting
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the average inter-arrival time of 20s. A running bus is randomly selected as the source of
the request, whose size follows an exponential distribution with mean 5MB. We fix the
number of APs in the network to 5, and vary the number of buses in the network. Note
that the average load in the system does not change with the number of buses.
As shown in Figure 3.8 (a), schemes using mobile helpers improve the data down-
load rate. As the number of buses grows, more mobile forwarding opportunities can be
exploited.
We also investigate the impact of vehicle overtaking by varying the vehicle velocity.
We achieve this by sampling the bus trace of both peak hour when buses tend to move
slower and off-peak hour when buses move faster. As the variation of vehicle velocity
increases, the overtaking probability increases. For example, when the variation increases
to 0.6, the ratio of contacts due to overtaking is 25%. Figure 3.8 (b) shows that the av-
erage data rate remains fairly constant with respect to overtaking, and the MobTorrent
scheduling scheme constantly outperforms other on-line schemes in all velocity variation
settings. Since location information is not explicitly utilized by the other three on-line
schemes, it is not surprising that performance of them remains fairly stable. For MobTor-
rent, when the relative node locations are not static any more, the performance is fairly
robust for the following reasons. First, in MobTorrent, blocks only possessed by a fore-
runner that is nearer to the client are given higher priority for replication. This reduces
the impact of overtaking, since the blocks on a forerunner being overtaken by the client
may have already been delivered when overtaking occurs. Second, when a forerunner is
overtaken by the client or another forerunner, a new opportunistic contact between the
two nodes is created, which would not have occurred without overtaking. The overall
impact of overtaking on MobTorrent’s performance is not significant.
Finally, we investigate the impact of path divergence by making vehicles disappear
from the system suddenly. As shown in Figure 3.8 (c), the performance of all forwarding
schemes degrades as the disappearance rate increases. While MobTorrent’s performance
remains the best among all on-line schemes evaluated, overall performance is similar
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among all schemes when path divergence occurs with a probability higher than 20% per
node per minute.
3.5 Related Work
3.5.1 Multi-hop Cellular Networks
Due to the complementary characteristics of cellular networks and Wi-Fi networks, a
number of research efforts have tried to combine them. In many of these approaches,
only the cellular BSs are gateways to Internet and Wi-Fi networks are used to improve
the performance of the cellular networks infrastructure, e.g., for coverage expansion [3],
load balancing [109], and better channel utilization [69], as discussed in Section 1.2 of
Chapter 1. Hsieh and Sivakumar give a comprehensive survey of these approaches [46].
In comparison, we use the cellular network mainly as a control channel for a vehicle to
send out request and acknowledge the data it has received.
3.5.2 Vehicular Internet Access using Wi-Fi Networks
In the area of vehicular Internet access using Wi-Fi networks, Ott and Kutscher [84] pro-
pose a framework to support so-called drive-through Internet. The key component is a
session protocol (PCMP) that offers persistent end-to-end communication even though
the vehicles on the road only have intermittent contacts with roadside APs. In their work,
for vehicles with velocity from 40km/h to 180km/h, a few Mega Bytes could be trans-
ferred to and from the mobile node using TCP and UDP. As part of the MIT Cartel project,
Bychkovsky et al. [21] measure the upload bandwidth available to vehicles in the Boston
metropolitan area using in-situ unplanned open APs. The result is also encouraging. The
upload TCP bandwidth has a median of 30 KBps, and median transfer size per contact
duration is 216 Kilo Bytes. Cabernet [32] further improves the performance by optimiz-
ing both the connection establishment procedure (QuickWiFi) and the transport protocol
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(CTP). Another measurement of Wi-Fi connectivity from moving vehicle is described by
Mahajan et al. [70]. Zhang et al. [114] investigate scheduling issues for vehicle uploading
or downloading from a roadside unit. Balasubramanian et al. [8] propose ViFi, a protocol
that opportunistically exploits base station diversity to minimize disruptions and support
interactive applications for mobile clients. In comparison, we focus on the setting where
roadside Wi-Fi AP only provides partial coverage (around 25% from our measurement or
even lower), so that the main application of interest is delay-tolerant bulk file transfer.
3.5.3 Delay-Tolerant Network Routing
Another direction in the area of vehicular communication is from the angle of Delay-
Tolerant Network (DTN). Vahdat and Becker [104] propose the “store-carry-forward”
epidemic routing approach for intermittently connected networks. They use the hop count
of messages to regulate the resource usage. Spyro et al. [99] show that binary splitting
is optimal under certain assumptions for spreading a given number of replicas into the
network. To improve over blind replication, Lendgren et al. [68] propose PROPHET,
which is shown to work better than epidemic routing, based on the observation that real
users tend to move in a predictable fashion with repeating behavioral patterns. UMASS’s
DieselNet project presents a study of vehicle (public buses) contact time [113], and pro-
poses a series of routing protocols [7, 18, 19]. There are several major differences between
MobTorrent and existing DTN routing works, as most of the latter are designed for the
general case where the mobility pattern is largely structureless, and using historic meet-
ing information is recognized as a good heuristic to estimate future contact probability. In
above systems, the target application is communication among mobile nodes, the target
message delivery delay is often in the scale of hours (e.g., the average delivery delay is
67.5 minutes using epidemic routing in the DieselNet trace [113]), and the target delivery
rate is dozens of packets per hour. Instead, our interest is to use the capacity of inter-
mittently connected networks to supplement the bandwidth of cellular networks, and we
focus on the data transmission between roadside APs and mobile clients. The target de-
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livery delay is in a few minutes, and the target delivery rate is hundreds of Kbps, which is
comparable to that of HSDPA network. To achieve this, we make full use of the mobility
information from in-situ AVL system.
Zhao et al. [116] and Li and Rus [64] propose to use Mobile ferry routing approach
for data delivery in a sparsely connected network. The main idea is to introduce some
non-randomness in node movement or actively change trajectories to help deliver data.
However, in the scenario we are interested in, it is not likely that nodes will move just to
accommodate communication.
Prefetching has been used extensively to speedup web download [85]. In a vehicular
environment, Balasubramanian et al. propose using prefetching to speed up access to
result of web queries [9]. We use prefetching in a different way, as the uncertainty comes
from the varying contact opportunities instead of the file required.
Chakravorty et al. [23] propose the concept of treating the provision of wide-area
wireless service for mobile users as a free market. Motani et al. [78] and Lee et al. [60]
propose architecture to support a market place over mobile users.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we present MobTorrent, an on-demand, user-driven framework for vehi-
cles to access Internet via roadside static APs and other mobile vehicles on the road.
MobTorrent has the following components. In order to improve network throughput
performance, prefetching and caching are used to better exploit the short contact time
between AP and client by having the data locally available for transfer. In addition, to
address the issue of low coverage, data can be pushed to mobile helpers so that areas
where Wi-Fi can be used for data transfer are not limited to coverage of static roadside
APs but expand to include areas covered by mobile nodes. Our results based on real world
experiments and trace-driven simulations show that MobTorrent provides substantial im-
provement over other existing frameworks.
Chapter 4
MobiCent: an Incentive-compatible
Credit-based System for DTN
4.1 Introduction
Delay-Tolerant Networks are characterized by intermittent connectivity. Such networks
are assumed to experience frequent, long-duration partitioning and often lack an end-to-
end contemporaneous path [35]. As proposed in Chapter 3, in future mobile communi-
cation systems, the high-bandwidth but intermittent wireless connections among partic-
ipants can be exploited using the Delay-Tolerant Networking (DTN) approach, so as to
enhance the performance of traditional cellular networks. MobTorrent demonstrates the
viability of the proposed approach in vehicular networks. In addition to that, DTN ap-
proach can also be potentially applied to mobile human social networks, where people
carrying wireless mobile devices communicate through low-power high-bandwidth links,
like Ultra WideBand (UWB). The MIT Reality Mining project [76] and the Pocket Switch
Network [48] are examples of mobile human social networks.
In the targeted civilian and commercial environments, the mobile nodes are managed
by autonomous and selfish parties, thus an incentive scheme should be employed to foster
cooperation among participants. However, this opens the possibility that a selfish node
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may game the system, by performing hidden actions that increase its own reward from
the incentive scheme while degrading the overall system performance.
For example, if we assume that a fixed amount of reward is to be equally shared
among all nodes on a forwarding path, a selfish node can create Sybil nodes [28] and
forge phantom forwarding edges among its Sybil nodes to exaggerate its contribution. In
this way (i.e. edge insertion attack), the node increases its share of the reward. However,
such selfish behavior discourages other nodes from participating in the forwarding. As
another way to maximize its own reward, a selfish node may also purposely not forward
data to other relays, betting that it can deliver the data directly to the client and thus keeps
the entire reward. Such an attack (i.e. edge hiding attack) is demonstrated earlier by the
mobile forwarding game example in Section 1.3 of Chapter 1. These selfish actions reduce
the network capacity, resulting in both lower delivery ratio and higher delay. In this work,
we focus on rational nodes rather than malicious nodes. A rational node carries out an
action only if doing so can increase its own payoff. In comparison, a malicious node is
willing to take any action that degrades the system’s performance, regardless of its own
payoff.
There are two key challenges in designing the incentive scheme for DTN. First, dis-
connections among nodes are the norm rather than exception. As a result, selfish actions
as described above are extremely difficult to detect. In sharp contrast, traditional end-to-
end connected wireless networks can rely on the mutual control among the autonomous
peers to detect any such deviation. Second, as contacts are often unpredictable in DTN,
the delivery paths cannot be predetermined, but must be discovered along with the for-
warding of data instead. Again, the routing behavior of traditional end-to-end connected
wireless networks is fundamentally different, as the delivery path is often determined be-
fore the actual data pass through. Because of these two differences, existing incentive
schemes for end-to-end connected wireless networks cannot be directly applied, as will
be elaborated more later in Section 4.7.
In this chapter, we present MobiCent [26], a credit-based system for DTN. MobiCent
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is largely motivated by, and directly designed upon MobTorrent. On one hand, MobTor-
rent shows that the application of DTN in a commercial environment can be useful. Thus,
a natural follow-up question is how to motivate the nodes to cooperate. On the other hand,
the existence of the highly available control channel in MobTorrent can facilitate multi-
ple designs in the proposed MobiCent protocol. However, the attacks as identified and
addressed by MobiCent are fundamental to the nature of DTN, thus, MobiCent’s credit-
based solution can potentially be generalized to foster cooperation in other forms of DTN
systems different from MobTorrent.
We make the following contributions in this chapter:
1) We identify edge insertion attacks and edge hiding attacks as the two major forms
of attacks in a DTN environment. It is extremely difficult to detect them in DTN, and they
can seriously degrade the performance of DTN routing.
2) We take the algorithmic mechanism design approach [82] to address the two forms
of attacks, and identify the necessary conditions under edge insertion attacks for a pay-
ment scheme to be incentive compatible, i.e., truthful participation is adopted by selfish
nodes.
3) We propose incentive-compatible payment mechanisms to cater to client that wants
to minimize either payment or data delivery delay.
MobiCent does not require detection of selfish actions as it provides incentives for
selfish nodes to behave honestly. In addition, MobiCent does not require pre-determined
routing path. It works on top of existing DTN routing protocols to ensure that selfish
actions do not result in larger rewards. To the best of our knowledge, MobiCent is the first
incentive-compatible scheme proposed for replication-based DTN routing protocols.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the system model
and formulates the attack model and the path revelation game. The message exchange
protocol to support MobiCent is described in Section 4.3. We analyze the payment scheme
required to thwart edge insertion attacks in Section 4.4, followed by the mechanisms


















Figure 4.1: MobiCent Framework
4.6. In Section 4.7, we describe related incentive schemes. We conclude in Section 4.8.
4.2 System Model and Problem Formulation
4.2.1 System Model
As assumed in MobTorrent, MobiCent is based on a network model where the nodes can
have access to two different networks. All nodes participate in a mostly disconnected
network, where short-range high-bandwidth links are used for data transfer. At the same
time, some of the nodes (in particular the source and destination nodes) have access to
a mostly available network, where long-range low-bitrate links are used for control mes-
sages.
The network architecture assumed for MobiCent is shown in Figure 4.1. The compo-
nents are:
• Trusted Third Party (TTP) stores key information for all nodes and provides ver-
ification and payment services.
• Helpers are mobile or static nodes (node X, Y, Z in the figure) that will help in data
relaying using the high-bandwidth intermittent link. Helpers (except for the source
node) do not need to have a highly available control channel.
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• Mobile Clients are the destination nodes (node C in the figure) which initiate down-
loading. We assume that mobile clients have high-bandwidth but intermittent links
for data transfer and highly available but low-bandwidth links for control messages.
A typical downloading process in MobiCent begins with the mobile client requesting
data from a data source that can be another mobile node or a data store / web server
in the Internet. In the former case, the mobile source node needs access to the control
channel in order to initiate packet transfer. In the latter case (as studied in MobTorrent),
the destination node obtains the data via some access points (APs). These APs are special
helpers with Internet access, and they are the data sources within the wireless domain. In
the example of Figure 4.1, data for a request initiated by the client C before time t1 can
be transferred from the AP X to the helper Y at time t1, Y to Z at time t2 and finally to C
at time t3. If data are replicated among the nodes, C can also receive data from Y at time
t4 and the AP X directly at time t5. Different paths complement one another, as each of
them is subject to uncertainty.
A detailed description of the system including the message exchange protocol is pre-
sented in Section 4.3. We will first present a brief overview here. We use standard cryp-
tographic techniques and en-route onion encryption [72] to prevent free riding, restrict
strategy set of participants and handle dispute among relays and client. More specifically,
each relay encrypts the data payload with a one-time symmetric key before forwarding
it. The key is also sent along with data in an encrypted form, such that only the TTP can
recover the keys. Thus, after a client receives the encrypted data, the only way for the
client to retrieve the decrypted data is to make payment to the TTP in exchange for the
encryption key(s). Similarly, the only way for the relay to get payment is to be involved
in the forwarding process. Note that the lightweight message exchange protocol handles
a wide array of attacks, but it cannot prevent both client and relay from launching edge in-
sertion attacks and edge hiding attacks, which will be described in detail in Section 4.2.3.
To address these attacks, an incentive compatible payment scheme is needed.
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4.2.2 MobiCent and DTN Routing
MobiCent runs on top of a given DTN routing module, and does not rely on any specific
routing protocol. We first present a generic model of DTN routing. When two nodes
meet, they exchange metadata on the packets they have in their respective buffers. Based
on the information exchanged, each node decides which packets it wants the other node
to transfer (replicate) to it. The order of the packet transfer depends on the priority a node
associates with each packet. The amount of data that can be transferred in a single contact
is dependent on the duration of the opportunistic contact.
Various DTN routing protocols differ mainly on how each packet’s priority is deter-
mined. In the simplest version, all packets have the same priority. However, such simple
stateless epidemic routing is not efficient, and researchers have proposed many improve-
ments. For example, both direct and indirect contact histories are used in PROPHET [68].
In MaxProp [18], a combination of a few parameters, including contact history and packet
hop count, are used to determine a packet’s priority.
MobiCent works by setting the client’s payment and the relays’ rewards so that nodes
will behave truthfully. Therefore, nodes will always forward packets without adding phan-
tom links, and never waste contact opportunity unless the reward is inadequate or it is the
decision of the underlying routing protocol. As a result, the (best) forwarding paths that
should be discovered by the given routing protocol through replication will be discovered.
4.2.3 Path Revelation Game
Before formulating the problem as a path revelation game, we first define some termi-
nologies.
Definition 4.1 An edge e represents the opportunistic contact between two nodes, through
which data can be forwarded between them. Formally, an edge e is defined by the two
nodes {v1,v2} in contact (referred to as the edge’s vertices) and the contact time t(e) 1.
1For easy presentation, we assume that contacts do not overlap and have enough capacities to exchange
data. Thus, both the contact duration and its capacity are omitted in our formulation.
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For example, Figure 4.2 plots the scenario depicted in Figure 4.1 as a contact graph
over time axis. In the figure, X meets Y at time t1, and the corresponding edge is denoted
as e = ({X ,Y}, t1), where X and Y are e’s vertices. Given a node v, the set of edges
containing it as a vertex is denoted as E(v).
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Figure 4.2: A contact graph plotted over time axis
Definition 4.2 A contact graph is denoted by G = (V,E), where V is the set of nodes in
the system, and E is the set of edges among the nodes.
In Figure 4.2, V = {X ,Y,Z,C}, and E = {({X ,Y}, t1), ({Y,Z}, t2), ({Z,C}, t3), ({Y,C}, t4),
({X ,C}, t5)}.
Definition 4.3 A forwarding path is a sequence of nodes from the source to the destina-
tion, such that, from each of its nodes, there is an edge to the next node in the sequence,
and edges appear in non-decreasing contact time.
Given a path P, Relay(P) is the set of relays on the path. Note that source is consid-
ered as a relay. The number of relays on path |Relay(P)| is defined as the length of the
path. A path P with length n is called a n-hop path. At the contact time of its last edge, a
path P is revealed to the destination.
In Figure 4.2, there are three paths (P1, P2, and P3) from the source node X to the des-
tination node C. Path P1 consists of three edges: ({X ,Y}, t1), ({Y,Z}, t2), and ({Z,C}, t3)
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Figure 4.3: Attacks
in sequence; P2 consists of two edges: ({X ,Y}, t1) and ({Y,C}, t4) in sequence; and P3 is
a 1-hop path consisting of a single edge ({X ,C}, t5)).
The charge to the client and the reward to the relays are determined by a payment
scheme consisting of two algorithms, namely, a payment set selection algorithm, deter-
mining which relays should be paid, and a payment calculation algorithm, which deter-
mines how much credit should be paid to each selected relay, and how much should be
charged to the client.
As stated in Section 4.2.1, MobiCent uses its message exchange protocol to constrain
the strategy space of users, so that edge insertion attacks and edge hiding attacks are the
two major forms of selfish actions that a node can take. We will illustrate how a selfish
node gains from cheating under a natural payment scheme. The example is based on the
contact graph in Figure 4.2. Without loss of generality, we assume the use of the earliest-
path fixed-amount payment scheme. Under the scheme, a client pays for each received
data block a fixed total amount of 3 cents, which is shared equally by all relays on the
earliest delivery path. A helper participates if the payoff is more than 1 cent, thus the
maximum path length is 3.
For illustration purpose, we redraw Figure 4.2 to highlight the edges that belong to
different paths in Figure 4.3. Thus, some nodes (e.g., the client C), which are receivers in
multiple edges, are plotted as multiple instances in the figure.
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Figure 4.3 (a) shows an edge insertion attack. In the figure, when a selfish AP X
gets the data, it estimates the delivery probability for all possible paths, denoted as p(P1),
p(P2), and p(P3) respectively. Recall that the reward per node is 3n cents where n is the
length of the delivery path. Suppose p(P1) = 1 and p(P2) = 12 + ε(> 0). By creating a
Sybil node X∗ and forging a phantom transfer from X to X∗ before forwarding the data
to Y , X can claim 23 of the total payment if P2 succeeds. However, due to this additional
edge, Y will not be able to forward to Z, as the maximum length (3) is reached already.
Thus, path P1 is not revealed. By launching the edge insertion attack, the expected reward
of X by forwarding via Y is 3× 23 × p(P2) = 1 + 2ε. In comparison, the reward if X
transfers honestly is only 3× 13 × p(P1) = 1. As a result, the selfish behavior of node
X increases its own payoff, but hurts the system performance by reducing the success
delivery probability from 1 to as low as 12 +ε (if p(P3) = 0). The delivery time is delayed
from t3 to no earlier than t4.
The client can also cheat by launching edge insertion attacks. For example, when it
meets X directly through path P3, it can pretend to be a relay instead, so that it can recover
some of its payment as the Sybil relay.
Figure 4.3 (b) shows an edge hiding attack. Depending on the estimated delivery
probabilities, node X may decide not to forward the packet to other relays at all. Suppose
p(P3) = 23 + ε(> 0). In this case, in order to selfishly maximize its own reward, node X
will not forward the data to Y, i.e., hiding the edge ({X ,Y}, t1). This holds regardless of
the value of p(P1) and p(P2), and even when X is allowed to launch edge insertion attacks
(as described above). The selfish behavior of node X hurts the system performance, by
reducing the success delivery probability from up to 1, to as low as 23 + ε, and delaying
the delivery time to t5.
Given G = (V,E), the two attacks can be formalized as:
Definition 4.4 A node v launches an edge insertion attack by creating a Sybil node v′
such that G is modified to G′ = (V ′,E ′), where V ′ = V ∪ {v′}, and E ′ = Ev→(v,v′) ∪
{(v,v′, t)}. Ev→(v,v′) means for any edge e in E(v), the vertex corresponding to node v
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can be set to either v or v′.
Definition 4.5 A node v launches an edge hiding attack by modifying G to G′ = (V,E−
e), where e ∈ E(v).
A selfish node can launch one or both attacks multiple times. Now we can define the
path revelation game formally.
Definition 4.6 A path revelation game is a distributed online game to reveal paths on a
contact graph G.
• Each node (including both relay and client) is a player.
• As an edge e is formed, only its two vertex nodes together can reveal the existence
of the edge.
• The possible strategies of a player are (1) acting honestly, or (2) launching edge
insertion attacks and edge hiding attacks.
• The payment scheme calculates payoff for each player based on the revealed contact
graph.
The payment scheme determines the outcome of the game, and it should be designed
to discover some desirable path(s) from source(s) to destination (e.g., the earliest path or
the shortest path). More specifically, we design payment schemes to meet the following
goals:
1) Incentive compatible: Truthful participation is adopted by both client and relay,
despite of their selfish nature.
2) Efficient and frugal: If there is at least one path revealed before a given deadline,
the client should be able to recover the data with minimum payment. If a client is willing
to pay more (but still bounded amount) to recover its data as soon as possible, the client
should be able to recover its data upon revelation of the earliest path.
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Among auction games, our work is closest to the well-studied path auction game.
In this game, there is a network G = (V,E), in which each edge e ∈ E is owned by an
agent. The true cost of e is private information and known only to the owner. Given two
vertices, source s and destination t, the customer’s task is to buy a path from s to t. Path
auction games have been extensively studied and much of the literature has focused on the
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. In the VCG mechanism, the customer pays
each agent on the winning path (i.e., the path with the minimum amount of total cost) an
amount equal to the highest bid with which the agent would still be on the winning path.
This mechanism is attractive as it is incentive compatible.
Existing works [30, 94] have shown that VCG is vulnerable to false-name manipula-
tion, a form of the Sybil attack. Furthermore, it is well known that VCG is not frugal for
the path auction game [6, 31, 51], i.e., a VCG-based incentive-compatible scheme may
result in very large payment.
A key difference between our work and the work on the path auction game is that in
our work the contact graph is the information to be elicited from the participants, whereas
in the latter, the topology is static and known to all.
In the rest of this chapter, we first present the message exchange protocol to support
MobiCent in Section 4.3. Following that, we analyze the payment algorithm required to
combat edge insertion attacks in Section 4.4, then present the thwarting of edge hiding
attacks in Section 4.5.
4.3 MobiCent Message Exchange Protocol
In MobiCent, we exploit the highly available low-bandwidth control channel at destination
to allow a Trusted Third Party (TTP) to mediate the file transfer process. We will explain
the message flow using file downloading from Internet as an example. The case of a
source node initiating a file transfer to a destination node is similar. Message exchanges
occur in three stages: (1) data request, (2) data forwarding, and (3) data recovery.
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Suppose the TTP’s public and private keys are PT and ST respectively, and a partic-
ipating node (helper or client) R’s public and private keys are PR and SR respectively. In
addition, R shares with the TTP a symmetric key kT R.
Each node only needs to know its own public and private keys, the shared secret
key with the TTP and the TTP’s public key. For the TTP, besides its own public and
private keys, it has to know the shared secret keys and public keys of all nodes. A new
participating node has to inform the TTP of its public key and choose the shared secret
key with the TTP. Furthermore, the TTP encrypts the pair {node id, node’s public key}
with its private key and this signature is stored on the participating node.
4.3.1 Data Request
To initiate the downloading process, a client C first sends the file download request r =<
C, f , p(), t0, td,α > to the TTP in a secure way. f is the file description including its name,
size, and the approach to locate the file (e.g. URL address). p() is the payment function,
which will be discussed in detail in Section 4.4 and Section 4.5. t0 and td are the start time
and deadline of the request respectively. α indicates the valid geographical area/region
for the request to propagate.
After receiving and successfully decoding/verifying the request, the TTP encrypts r
with its private key and sends C the request signature ST (r).
Upon receiving the TTP’s approval, C can then forward < r,ST (r) > to all APs within
the specified area α. C may need to contact a directory server to find out the list of APs
in the area.
When an AP gets the request, it first checks the validity of the signature from the TTP,
as well as the file description, the time and area scope. It may also consider the amount
of promised payment to decide whether to help or not. If the reward is sufficient, the AP
begins to prefetch the file block by block, with a predetermined block size. These blocks
are then replicated to the helpers using the DTN approach.
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4.3.2 Data Forwarding
Each node R maintains a list of blocks L1(R) that it currently holds, and a list of blocks
L2(R) that it has requested but not received yet. When two nodes A and B are near
each other, they can communicate directly via the short-range high-bandwidth link. They
will begin with an exchange of the metadata to reconcile their block lists L1(A), L1(B),
L2(A) and L2(B), and agree on the subset of blocks to be exchanged and the sequence
to exchange blocks. The exact block subsets that are exchanged depend on the routing
algorithm [7, 18, 25].
For the ith block of request r, the message being forwarded consists of three parts
as shown in Figure 4.4 (a). The header H contains the basic information < r, i,ST (r) >
which remains the same for all hops. The header is followed by the encrypted data and
supplementary layers, which are being modified and appended to respectively at every
hop.
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Figure 4.4: Message format
Denote C0 as the requested content in clear text, and Cn as the encrypted content
forwarded by the nth hop node (n = 1,2, ...). Let the nth hop relay be denoted by Rn.
Before forwarding a received block with data payload Cn−1 to the next hop, the relay
Rn generates a unique symmetric key kn for the block, and substitutes the data payload
with Cn = Ekn(Cn−1). Note that kn is only used to encrypt the current block and a new key
is generated for each block encryption.
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In addition, it appends a new supplementary layer with 2 components, Ln[1] and
Ln[2]. The first component Ln[1] contains the current relay’s ID Rn, and an encrypted field
of four subfields, namely the previous relay’s id Rn−1, the current relay’s id Rn, the next
relay’s id Rn+1 and the secret key kn used for data block encryption. The shared secret
key of the TTP and Rn is used to encrypt this element. The array of {L j[1]} is the data
that will be forwarded to the TTP later by the mobile client to recover the data. For the
source node, a randomly generated value is used for Rn−1.
The second component Ln[2] consists of just one fields, a cryptographic hash (e.g.
using MD5 or SHA-1) of the whole block minus the currently computed hash values,
encrypted using the current relay’s private key (SRN ). This component is required for
verification and auditing purpose and is only sent to the TTP when there is a dispute.
The next relay Rn+1 first verifies the header H to make sure that request r is valid.
Then, the relay Rn+1 stores the data block and the identity Rn which is needed to generate
the next supplementary layer if it forwards the message further. Before forwarding, it also
needs to verify Ln[2] using Rn’s public key. This key is verified using the TTP’s signature
for the pair {Rn, PRn} obtained from Rn.
Note that a relay node does not need to contact the TTP during the process. This
has two benefits: (1) reduce the load of the TTP, and (2) enable a mobile node without a
highly available control channel to become a relay.
In the forwarding process, for each block, a sender Rn needs to perform 2 symmetric
key encryption (over the data payload and Ln[1]), and signs 1 fields (Ln[2]) using its own
private key. The receiver Rn+1 needs to verify Ln[2] using the sender’s public key PRn
for each block. The receiver also needs to verify the sender’s public key (per neighbor
overhead) and the TTP’s signature for the request (per request overhead).
4.3.3 Data Recovery
Without loss of generality, suppose the block is delivered from source R1 to the client C
via two store-and-forward hops R1 → R2 with one-time encryption key k1, and R2 → C
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with key k2.
C sends to the TTP (in a secure way) the following key request < r, i,L1[1],L2[1] >
as shown in Figure 4.4 (b).
From this information, the TTP is able to recover the required secret keys k1 and k2.
The TTP then sends {k1,k2} to C.
With these keys, C is able to decrypt the data block using each key in the given
list sequentially until all keys are used and the original text is recovered. At this point,
we assume that C is able to validate clear text through checksum in the clear text or
application level semantic. If data are valid, C sends confirmation to the TTP. Otherwise,
C sends a dispute with the encrypted data it receives (Cn) and the list of elements in
{Ln[2]} to the TTP.
The TTP settles the credit transfer off-line. In addition, the TTP may broadcast the
ACK for block r, i in the area α after the request is completed.
If a client does not submit any key request before the deadline, the TTP will assume
that the process fails. All pending data blocks in the network automatically time out.
4.3.4 Protocol Properties
The message exchange protocol has the following properties. First, it prevents free-riding
through the use of en-route onion encryption. More specifically, a client cannot get its
desired content without payment, and a helper cannot get payment without helping with
the forwarding process. Note that, there is no monetary barrier for a potential forwarder
to participate. As the forwarder does not need to decrypt the data, it does not pay for the
content.
Next, the protocol prevents a node from modifying an existing valid path segment
since each relay encrypts the identities of the previous, current and next relays. Based on
the information contained in the message, the protocol can deterministically detect nodes
that modify the path. Thus a node’s valid strategy space is to modify its own edges, i.e.,
by launching edge insertion attacks and edge hiding attacks.
109
Both communication overhead and computation load on the TTP are minimum. Re-
lays do not need to contact the TTP during forwarding, and payment settlement is per-
formed off-line. Finally, forwarding requires public-key cryptography that may be expen-
sive. We discuss this issue further in Section 4.6.4.
4.4 Thwarting Edge Insertion Attacks
Suppose relays on a delivery path are selected for payment, we consider the design of
payment calculation algorithm to thwart edge insertion attacks. The intuition behind our
design is: (1) To deal with relay’s cheating, we observe that introducing Sybil nodes
allows a relay to claim a larger fraction of the total reward, while increasing the delivery
path length. Although we cannot prevent a relay from stealing a larger fraction of rewards
from the total reward (as we cannot distinguish between a real node and a Sybil node),
we can make the total reward decreases as a function of the path length. As long as the
total reward diminishes faster than the increase of a selfish node’s relative share, the relay
will only decrease its overall reward by introducing Sybil nodes. (2) Similar idea applies
to thwarting edge insertion attacks from the client. More specifically, although we cannot
prevent the client from reclaiming some of its payment back as a Sybil relay, we can
increase its charge as a client according to the path length, such that there is no net gain
for the client.
We consider a general payment scheme S. Given a n-hop path, we define the mini-
mum payment to an individual relay in the path as RewardminS (n), and define the charge
to a client using a n-hop path as ChargeS(n).
Lemma 4.1 To prevent a relay from gaining by launching edge insertion attacks, 2×
RewardminS (n+1)≤ RewardminS (n).
Proof: Consider a relay R on a n-hop path. Suppose R gets the minimum reward
RewardminS (n). By inserting a Sybil node R′, its reward is the sum of the payments to
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two relays on a (n+1)-hop path, which is no less than 2×RewardminS (n+1). In order to
prevent R from gaining by doing so, we must have 2×RewardminS (n+1)≤ RewardminS (n).
Lemma 4.2 To prevent a client from gaining by launching edge insertion attacks,
ChargeS(n+1)≥ChargeS(n)+RewardminS (n+1).
Proof: By appending a phantom edge on a n-hop path, a client can gain reward
as the Sybil node. Since the new path contains n + 1 hops, the reward to the appended
Sybil node is no less than RewardminS (n +1). In order to prevent the client from gaining
by doing so, RewardminS (n+1)−ChargeS(n+1)≤−ChargeS(n).
Note that, our formulation is general, as it does not exclude the use of other factors to
determine payment. For example, we allow the rewards for different relays on the same
path to be different.
Lemma 4.1 states that the payment scheme should ensure that a relay’s incremental
gain by being paid as multiple Sybil nodes grows slower than the reduction of each in-
dividual’s payment (due to the increase of the path length). Similarly, Lemma 4.2 states
that the incremental increase of a client’s payment for using a longer path is greater than
the reward the client earns as the added Sybil node.
The two lemmas show that existing payment schemes, including the fixed-amount
payment scheme we considered above, as well as others [50, 118] are not incentive com-
patible under edge insertion attacks.
To simplify the presentation without loss of generality, we assume that 1 cent is the
minimum reward required to motivate a relay to participate in the forwarding process.
Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2 together lead to Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.1 To enable incentive-compatible forwarding while ensuring deficit-free for
the TTP2, the payment charged to a client for using a n-hop path is at least 2n−1.
2The deficit-free property means that the TTP charges no less credit from the client than the total amount
it pays to the relays. If the deficit-free property is not ensured, malicious node can make profit from phantom
transactions.
111
Proof: As RewardminS (n)≥ 1, from Lemma 4.1, we have RewardminS (i)≥ 2n−i for 1≤
i≤ n. Using Lemma 4.2, we have: ChargeS(n)≥∑ni=1 RewardminS (i)≥∑ni=1 2n−i = 2n−1
While the bound may seem large, we argue that it is feasible to be adopted in practice,
because:
1) The client can specify the maximum hop N according to its requirement and utility
function to control the maximum possible payment.
2) While the cost of using a small N (3 to 5) is low, it is sufficient in some typical
DTN scenarios, as will be shown in Section 4.6.
3) Many practical DTN routing algorithms pose a limit on the hop count for better
use of network resources. As an example, Spray and Wait [99] uses no more than 5 hops
to spread 16 copies, a number sufficient in some typical DTN scenarios.
As existing schemes do not satisfy the required property, we introduce a new incentive-
compatible payment algorithm that minimizes the client’s payment.
Multiplicative Decreasing Reward (MDR)
Given the maximum path length N and an arbitrarily small positive ε,
if a n-hop (1 ≤ n ≤ N) path is selected, each relay on the path gets the
same reward of:
RewardMDR(n) = (2+ ε)N−ncents (4.1)
and the client is charged by
ChargeMDR(n) = (2+ ε)N − (2+ ε)N−ncents (4.2)
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Theorem 4.2 Under the MDR payment algorithm, both client and relay have no incentive
to launch edge insertion attacks.
Proof: Under the MDR payment algorithm, if a client on a n-hop path launches
edge insertion attacks, and inserts k ≥ 1 extra edges, its net payoff is:
k×RewardMDR(n+ k)−ChargeMDR(n+ k)




(2+ ε)N−n− (2+ ε)N
< (2+ ε)N−n− (2+ ε)N (since ε > 0,k ≥ 1)
= −ChargeMDR(n) (4.3)
Hence, a client does not gain by inserting edge. Now let us consider the last relay
Rn on a n-hop path. Regardless of the behavior of previous relays (whether some of them
are Sybil nodes or not), if Rn launches edge insertion attacks and inserts k extra edges





(2+ ε)N−n < RewardMDR(n) (4.4)
Therefore, the dominant strategy for Rn is to act truthfully. Similar argument can be
applied iteratively to the previous relays starting from the (n− 1)th relay, assuming that
later relays on the path are rational. Therefore, based on iterative elimination of dominated
strategy, all relays adopt truth telling in the unique Nash equilibrium.
Note that truth telling is not dominant strategy for relays except for the last relay
since the strategy of a relay appearing earlier on the path can be affected by an irrational
relay appearing later on the path. However, the game is dominance solvable and all relays
adopt truth telling in the unique Nash equilibrium. The small positive ε in MDR payment
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algorithm is required in the proof to ensure the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. We
omit ε in the following discussions for brevity.
Among all payment schemes that satisfy the necessary conditions for incentive com-
patibility, Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 together imply:
Corollary 4.1 The MDR payment algorithm is the most frugal incentive compatible mech-
anism robust under edge insertion attacks.
Under the MDR payment algorithm, each relay’s individual reward and the sum of
all relays’ rewards decrease with the path length, whereas the client’s payment increases
with the path length. The maximum surplus or overpayment is reached when the longest
path (N hops) is used, which is: ChargeMDR(N)−N×RewardMDR(N) = (2)N − (N +1)
(with ε omitted).
This overpayment can be handled in the following ways. First, some of the overpay-
ment can be considered as payment to the system provider. Second, the overpayment may
be redistributed back to the mobile nodes if the redistribution is incentive compatible.
Cavallo discusses an incentive-compatible redistribution mechanism [22].
MDR alone is sufficient to handle edge insertion attacks given a selected set of relays.
However, edge hiding attacks may affect the set being selected. Thus, MDR algorithm
need to be used together with some payment set selection algorithm, which will be con-
sidered in the next Section.
4.5 Thwarting Edge Hiding Attacks
The high-level idea to thwart edge hiding attacks is to determine an incentive-compatible
relay set by examining a sufficient subset of the paths ever revealed before the deadline.
Intuitively, our solution provides the following two properties: (1) Participating in more
forwarding paths (by replicating to other relays) only increases a node’s probability of
being selected for payment. (2) If a relay participating in multiple paths is selected for
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payment, it will always be paid according to the path that gives it the highest reward,
regardless of the other paths that it participates. This should hold even if its most favorable
path (e.g. direct contact with the client) is revealed later than other less-favorable paths. In
another word, participating in more forwarding paths does not decrease a relay’s reward
amount if it is ever selected for payment. The combination of these two properties ensures
that a rational relay does not launch edge hiding attacks.
In the following, we present selection algorithms for two types of clients, namely:
• Cost-sensitive client: The client’s goal is to minimize payment under a given dead-
line constraint.
• Delay-sensitive client: The client’s goal is to minimize delay under a given payment
constraint.
While the algorithm for cost-sensitive clients is simpler than the algorithm for delay-
sensitive clients, they share the same intuition as described above. By catering for the two
types of clients, our schemes allow the trade-off between payment and delay. A client
selects the desired scheme explicitly when issuing its request. The two types of clients
can coexist in a single system.
4.5.1 Cost-sensitive Client
min-Cost Selection Algorithm Under this algorithm, the forwarding procedure is termi-
nated only at the deadline of the request, or upon revelation of a 1-hop path, whichever is
earlier. The client reports to the TTP the shortest path ever revealed when the terminating
condition is met. Only relays on the reported path are paid. Payments by the client and to
the relays are computed using the MDR algorithm.
Theorem 4.3 Under the min-Cost selection algorithm, both client and relay have no in-
centive to launch edge insertion attacks or edge hiding attacks.
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Proof: We first consider the dominant strategy for the client. The client cannot
arbitrarily fake the shortest path, as in that case it is not able to decode the correct data.
Given that the client pays the least with the real shortest path it can reveal, it has no
incentive to hide the shortest path it is able to get. Finally, Theorem 4.2 states that the
client has no incentive to append any Sybil node on the reported path.
For a given relay, we consider the two attacks sequentially:
1) Edge insertion attack: For a relay on the selected shortest path, Theorem 4.2 states
that inserting edge on the selected path does not benefit the relay. Inserting edge on any
non-selected path only increases its length, and does not make it the shortest path, thus
does not change the payment decision.
2) Edge hiding attack: for a relay on the selected shortest path P, hiding other paths
does not have impact, and hiding the shortest path can result in two scenarios. First,
another path that does not contain the relay is selected. Second, another path containing
the relay but with length no shorter than P is selected. In both cases, the relay’s payoff
does not increase, hence there is no incentive for the relay to do so. For a relay not on
the shortest path, hiding any path that containing it does not affect the shortest path being
selected, thus its payoff remains zero.
In Figure 4.5, all paths revealed to the client are shown at their revelation times. The
maximum path length N = 3. Note that the client is not shown in the paths. Among all
revealed paths, the client only accepts P1, P3, and P6, as each of them is the single shortest
path when they are revealed. The client reports the 1-hop path P6 to the TTP at t6, as there
is no path shorter can be revealed. The client pays ChargeMDR(1) = 23−23−1 = 4 cents,
and relay U on the reported path is paid by RewardMDR(1) = 23−1 = 4 cents.
If the deadline td is between t5 and t6 instead, the client will report path P3 at the new
td. Relays Y and W on P3 are paid, and each gets RewardMDR(2) = 23−2 = 2 cents, while
the client is charged by ChargeMDR(2) = 23−23−2 = 6 cents. The surplus is 6−2×2 = 2

























Figure 4.5: Paths revealed over time axis
4.5.2 Delay-sensitive Client
In this case, the decryption keys for data are given to the client by the TTP immediately
when the earliest path is revealed. Designing incentive-compatible scheme for delay-
sensitive clients is more complicated than for cost-sensitive clients because the payment
decision can only be finalized after examining the rest of the paths. Therefore, a mech-
anism must be incorporated to motivate the client to continue to reveal paths to the TTP
truthfully, even though it already has the decoded data.
Briefly, the min-Delay Selection Algorithm contains the following three steps:
1) Key revelation and initial payment by client: When the earliest path P1 is re-
vealed at t1, the client immediately decrypts it through the TTP, and is charged n×2N−1 +
(2n−2) cents, where N is the maximum path length, and n is P1’s hop count.
2) Reimbursement to client for reporting eligible paths: The client continues to
report eligible paths to the TTP, and the client is reimbursed 1 cent for every eligible path
it reports to the TTP.
3) Payment set selection: Based on the eligible path sequence that the client reports,
the TTP decides the set of relays R to be paid. Once R is determined, MDR payment
algorithm is applied over R to calculate the payment to relays.
We discuss the steps in more detail as follows:
Initial payment: In this step, the first portion of the payment n×2N−1 prevents the
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client from gaining by inserting a Sybil node in the earliest path and claiming back the
maximum reward 2N−1 with the inserted Sybil node. The second portion of the payment
2n−2 is the provident fund to pay the client for reporting eligible paths (maximum 2n−2
paths with 1 cent each) in the next step.
For example, in Figure 4.5, the earliest path P1 is used for decoding the message and
calculation of the client’s initial payment. As n = 3, the client pays n×2N−1 +(2n−2) =
3×23−1 +(23−2) = 18 cents.
Eligible path: Ideally, information about all paths can be collected. However, the
number of paths can be unbounded. Furthermore, if there is no eligibility constraint
on the path, the client can fake any number of paths by appending its Sybil nodes on the
earliest path or forging a path with only its Sybil nodes, to earn the reimbursement without
receiving and reporting any real path. We define an eligible path in the following way.
Definition 4.7 A path P is an eligible path, if and only if the intersection of its relays and
the relays on the earliest path P1 is a unique non-empty subset of Relay(P1).
Uniqueness is defined in the following way. A path P is an eligible path if there is no
other eligible path P′ such that Relay(P′)∩Relay(P1) = Relay(P)∩Relay(P1).
The eligible path is defined to meet the following three conditions: (1) the size of
the eligible path set must be bounded from above; (2) cheating from the client cannot
increase the eligible path set; and finally (3) the TTP must be able to calculate an incentive
compatible payment based on the eligible path set.
Condition (1) is clearly met since the number of non-empty subsets of Relay(P1) is
2n−1. Each non-empty subset corresponds to at most one eligible path, thus the number
of eligible paths (excluding P1 itself) is bounded by 2n − 2, which corresponds to the
amount we charged in the second portion of the initial payment by the client.
Condition (2) is met for the following two reasons. First, there is no Sybil node in P1,
and the size of eligible path set does not depend on any node outside Relay(P1). Thus,
the client cannot construct phantom eligible paths. Second, reordering of eligible paths
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does not change the size of the eligible path set. As the client does not gain by altering
the order of the reported paths, we assume that it reports the eligible paths in the order
they are revealed. The client can accumulate all paths, and report them to the TTP in one
message.
Finally, condition (3) is met when the eligible path selection is used in conjunction
with the relay payment set selection to be presented later.
We illustrate the determination of the eligible paths using Figure 4.5. Among all
paths revealed after P1, only path P2, P3, and P5 are eligible. The total reimbursement to
the client for these three eligible paths is 3 cents. Path P4 and P6 are not eligible paths due
to the uniqueness constraint. Note that, the client can hide P2 to make P4 an eligible path.
However, doing this does not increase the client’s reimbursement. Finally, path P7 is not
an eligible path because its intersection with P1 is empty.
Payment set selection: Denote the initial payment set as R1 = Relay(P1). The pay-
ment set is updated every time an eligible path is revealed. The update rule is as follows.
Suppose before an eligible path P is revealed, the payment set is Ri. If Ri∩Relay(P) 6= /0,
then the payment set is updated to Ri+1 = Ri∩Relay(P). Relays in the final payment set
Rk will be paid.
Let us look at the evolution of the payment set in the example given by Figure 4.5. The
eligible paths are {P1, P2, P3, P5}, and the initial payment set R1 = {U,V,W}. P2 updates
the payment set to R2 = Relay(P2)∩R1 = {U,V}. As P3’s intersection with R2 is /0, P3
is not used. P5 updates the payment set to R3 = Relay(P5)∩R2 = {U}, which is the final
payment set. Thus, only relay U is paid, and the reward is RewardMDR(|R3|) = 23−1 = 4
cents.
Note that, the correct calculation of payment set using the above selection algorithm
does not require the revelation of all eligible paths. However, reimbursing all eligible
paths is important to prevent the client from manipulating the report. Otherwise, if the
TTP reimburses the client only for the eligible paths used in the computation, the client
may have the incentive to hide some eligible paths so as to increase the number of the
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eligible paths needed. This will result in the incorrect (non incentive compatible) compu-
tation of the relay payment set.
We introduce a lemma before we present and prove the main theorem in this section.
Lemma 4.3 Under the payment set selection algorithm specified above, suppose the pay-
ment set is Ri at time t, given a relay R ∈ Ri, for every eligible path P revealed before t,
R ∈ Relay(P) implies Ri−{R} ⊂ Relay(P).
Proof: We prove it by contradiction. Suppose P∗ is the earliest eligible path
that is revealed before t and satisfies both R ∈ Relay(P∗) and ∃R′ 6= R such that, R′ ∈
Ri & R′ /∈ Relay(P∗). Suppose the payment set when P∗ is revealed is R∗. As P∗
is revealed before Ri. Ri ⊆ R∗, thus R′ ∈ R∗ as R′ ∈ Ri. We have /0 ⊂ Relay(P∗)∩Rk,
as R ∈ Relay(P∗)∩Rk. We also have Relay(P∗)∩Rk ⊂ Rk, as R′ /∈ Relay(P∗)∩Rk but
R′ ∈Rk. P∗ is the earliest path satisfying this condition, so it should be used to update the
payment set to Relay(P∗)∩R∗, which results in the removal of R′ from payment set, and
causes contradiction.
Theorem 4.4 Under the min-Delay allocation algorithm, both client and relay have no
incentive to launch edge insertion attacks and edge hiding attacks.
Proof: First, we show that the client’s dominant strategy is to act truthfully:
1) Edge insertion attack: By inserting a Sybil node into the earliest path (increasing
its length from n to n + 1), the client need to pay an extra [(n + 1)2N−1 +(2n+1− 2)]−
[n2N−1 + (2n − 2)] = 2N−1 + 2n cents. What it can earn through the Sybil node is at
most 2N−1 (if the Sybil node is the single relay in the final payment set) plus 2n cents
(by reporting 2n extra eligible paths). As the net payoff is non-positive, the client has no
incentive to insert Sybil node into the earliest path. Inserting Sybil node into latter paths
does not change the eligible path set, thus does not benefit the client either.
2) Edge hiding attack: Hiding the earliest path is against the client’s goal to minimize
the delay to recover data. Hiding latter eligible paths only reduces the client’s payoff.
Thus, the client has no incentive to hide path.
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We now prove that the dominant strategy for any relay is to act truthfully too, by
examining three types of relays in turn.
1) For a relay R in the final payment set Rk: On one hand, creating Sybil node R′ to
launch an edge insertion attack does not help, because: if R′ is not in the final payment
set, it does not earn R any extra reward. If R′ is in the final payment set, the total amount
earned by R and R′ is 2× 2N−(|Rk|+1) = 2N−|Rk|, which is equal to the reward of having
R alone. On the other hand, launching edge hiding attacks does not benefit as well. If R
is the only relay in the final payment set, it gets its optimal payment already. If Rk−{R}
is not empty, using Lemma 4.3, all paths containing R also contain Rk −{R}. Unless R
eliminates itself from the final payment set, it cannot exclude any node in Rk−{R} from
final payment set either.
2) For a relay R not on the earliest path, inserting or hiding edge cannot affect the
revelation of the earliest path, thus does not bring it any reward.
3) Now let us consider a relay R on the earliest path, but is excluded from the final
payment set. Without loss of generality, suppose R is eliminated from payment set Ri−1 by
a path P∗, i.e., R∈Ri−1 but R /∈Ri. Thus, P∗ satisfies Ri ⊂ Relay(P∗) and R /∈ Relay(P∗).
In addition, using Lemma 4.3, for every path P containing R that is revealed before P∗,
Ri ⊂ Relay(P). Thus, to make itself appear in payment set before the revelation of Pi, R
must make Ri appear in payment set also. In this case, P∗ is always an eligible path to
filter R out of the payment set. Even if R can hide all paths before Pi, Pi becomes the new
earliest path, and it defines a new initial payment set which does not contain R at all. In
this case, R still gets zero reward. Creating Sybil node does not prevent R (or any of its
Sybil nodes) from being eliminated by path P∗ either.
Thus, the min-Delay algorithm is incentive compatible.
From Theorem 4.4, we directly have:
Corollary 4.2 The min-Delay allocation algorithm reveals the earliest path, and the
client’s payment is bounded by O(N×2N), where N is the maximum path length allowed.
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4.6 Performance Evaluation
We evaluate MobiCent using the widely used traces from the Haggle project [48] and the
DieselNet project [113], which represent human social networks and vehicular networks
respectively. The Haggle trace [48] is collected in an experiment measuring forty-one
humans’ mobility at the Infocom 2005 conference. The device used to collect connection
opportunity data and mobility statistics in the experiment is the Intel iMote. The iMotes
were configured to perform a Bluetooth baseband layer “inquiry” discovering the MAC
addresses of other Bluetooth nodes in range. The DieselNet trace [113] is taken from
UMass DieselNet, a DTN consisting of Wi-Fi nodes attached to buses. As buses travel
their routes, they encounter other buses and establish pair-wise bus-to-bus connections.
The behavior of inter-contact times is important when considering the delay experienced
by packets in a DTN. This is the time a node has to wait to get in contact with a specific
node, counted from the moment from losing contact with that node. A closer look at
the inter-contact distribution of the two traces shows that the inter-contact time in the
Haggle trace tends to be longer than the inter-contact time in the DieselNet trace. For
example, around 20% of inter-contact time in the Haggle trace is longer than 3 hour,
whereas the value is only 10% in the DieselNet trace. This contributes to the difference
in their delivery performance.
MobiCent treats the routing protocol as a black box and is independent of the spe-
cific algorithm used. Our evaluation uses epidemic routing, and assumes each contact has
sufficient capacity to exchange data. Performance under other routing protocols and con-
strained contact capacity show similar trends, and are not presented here to save space.
Each experiment below is carried out 500 times with different random seeds, and the
average is presented.
We first evaluate the impact of hop count constraint on delivery performance. When
all nodes are honest, we show that even if we set the maximum hop constraint N to a













































Figure 4.6: Impact of hop count constraint
any constraint closely. Next, we evaluate the behavior of selfish nodes operating under the
natural earliest-path fixed-amount payment scheme such that cheating may result in gains
for some nodes. We show that cheating becomes the strategy of the majority of nodes,
and overall delivery performance degrades significantly. Payment schemes described by
Jakobsson et al. [50] and Zhong et al. [118] have the same vulnerability, as none of them
satisfy the properties we identified for incentive-compatible payment scheme in Section
4.4. Lastly, we show the behavior of selfish nodes operating under MobiCent, and plot
the resulted delivery performance as well as amount of payment by the client.
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4.6.1 Hop Count Limit
To evaluate the impact of hop count limit, we plot the delivery ratio over time where the
maximum hop count is limited to 1 (direct delivery), 2, and 3, against the setting where
there is no hop count constraint. We assume all nodes act honestly.
Figure 4.6 (a) plots the delivery ratio as a function of waiting time for the Haggle
trace under various maximum hop constraints of forwarding path. As shown in the figure,
for any given deadline, the delivery ratio increases with the maximum hop count allowed.
Allowing 2-hop forwarding almost doubles the delivery performance of the 1-hop-only
forwarding, while 3-hop forwarding achieves more than 95% of the delivery ratio at any
given deadline compared to the case without hop count constraint. Though not shown in
the figure, 5-hop forwarding achieves more than 99% of delivery performance. Similar
result is shown in Figure 4.6 (b) for the DieselNet trace. As a small N such as N (≤ 5)
suffices in most cases, the multiplicatively increasing payment of proposed schemes is
practically affordable, as will be shown later.
4.6.2 Cheating under Earliest-path Fixed-amount Scheme
We study the user behavior under the earliest-path fixed-amount payment scheme, where a
client pays a fixed amount (3 cents) to relays on the earliest path for each block delivered.
The amount is shared equally by all relays on the earliest forwarding path.
Figure 4.7 illustrates the system behavior using the Haggle trace when relays can
cheat by hiding edges or creating Sybil nodes to increase their own payoff. In each round,
each user generates two requests on average. There are two possible strategies: acting
truthfully or cheating. In the first round, all relays start truthfully. After each round, we
assume that each relay has access to the revealed contact graph and varies its strategy in
the next round if it has a higher expected payoff with the new strategy based on its own
experience in the current round.











































































Figure 4.7: Evolution of user behavior and delivery performance under earliest-path fixed-











































































Figure 4.8: Evolution of user behavior and delivery performance under earliest-path fixed-
amount payment scheme (DieselNet trace)
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ratio of honest users keeps decreasing and after 10 rounds, the system converges to a
sub-optimal state. Note that, cooperation may still be preferred by some users (20%), as
forwarding to other relay (honestly) increases the chance the node is on the selected path,
which compensates the loss in having to share the reward with others.
Figure 4.7 (b) shows that the delivery delay increases under attack. The average delay
is increased by 25%. As shown in Figure 4.7 (c), delivery ratio decreases by around 20%
under attack.
Figure 4.8 demonstrates similar trends for the DieselNet trace.
Another way to measure the impact of dishonest nodes is to consider the relative gain
of dishonest nodes vs. the honest nodes. When the ratio of dishonest nodes is fixed at
20%, simulation result shows that they collect more than 33% of the reward for both the
Haggle trace and the DieselNet trace. The average reward of honest participants is re-
duced by around 20%, and is only around half the reward earned by cheating participants.
When the ratio is increased to 50%, they collect 65% of the reward in the Haggle trace and
75% of reward in the DieselNet trace. In the latter trace, honest node’s reward is reduced
by 50%, and is only 1/3 of the rewards of dishonest nodes. This indicates that a large
portion of dishonest nodes can significantly decrease the reward for honest nodes. This
has the effect of discouraging honest nodes from joining the system, further reducing the
overall performance.
4.6.3 MobiCent Performance
In order to evaluate how MobiCent fosters cooperation, we repeat the previous experiment
but with all nodes initially cheating. As shown in Figure 4.9 (a), for both the min-Cost
algorithm and the min-Delay algorithm under the Haggle trace, from a state where all
players cheat and each player adapts its behavior based on its experience, all players
converge to the truth-telling strategy very quickly, with 90% choosing to act truthfully
after only 1 round. After 4 rounds, all nodes act truthfully and no node deviates from the








































Figure 4.9: Evolution of user behavior under MobiCent
the min-Delay algorithm for the DieselNet trace, as shown in Figure 4.9 (b).
Figure 4.10 (a) shows the delivery ratios for the Haggle trace using both the min-
Cost algorithm and the min-Delay algorithm. The delivery ratios of both algorithms are
identical and equal to the case where all nodes act honestly. This is expected since both
of these algorithms ensure that there is no edge insertion and hiding attacks.
Figure 4.10 (b) plots the average delay for a client to recover data under both algo-
rithms for the Haggle trace. The deadline is set to 600 minutes (10 hours). Since the first
path received is reported in the min-Delay algorithm, the delay achieved is the same as






























































































































Figure 4.11: MobiCent performance under varying hop count constraint (DieselNet trace)
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thus the delay for both algorithms are identical. When N > 1, the min-Delay algorithm
still recovers data in the earliest path, whereas the min-Cost algorithm needs to wait un-
til the revelation of a 1-hop path or the deadline, whichever is earlier. As shown in the
figure, the delay for the min-Cost algorithm is more than 100% more than the min-Delay
algorithm. The client is compensated for this large increase in delay by having to pay a
smaller amount of money to the TTP.
Figure 4.10 (c) plots the average payment by a client under both algorithms for the
Haggle trace. Recall that, as the maximum hop count N grows, the maximum payment
grows at O(2N) and O(N × 2N) respectively for the min-Cost algorithm and the min-
Delay algorithm. The figure shows that the average payment grows in an exponential
rate. However, as the average length of the earliest path is around 2, the average payment
by a client under the min-Delay algorithm is roughly two times of the average payment
under the min-Cost algorithm. Also recall that, when N = 3, the performance obtained is
close to the case without hop count constraint, in terms of both delivery ratio and delay.
For N = 3, the average cost for the min-Cost algorithm is 5.36 cents, and the average
cost for the min-Delay algorithm is 12.01 cents. Therefore, the payment is practically
affordable based on the current traces used, despite the exponential growth.
Figure 4.11 demonstrates similar trend under the DieselNet trace.
4.6.4 Implementation Issues
We discuss two implementation issues, namely encryption key size and computation over-
head.
There are two types of encryption keys. Public key encryption used is based on El-
liptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and 192-bit keys are used. The signature generated is
48 bytes. For symmetric key encryption, 128-bit AES algorithm is used. In order to re-
duce overhead, a 192-bit request identifier rid can be selected with its signature computed
by the TTP. These identifier and signature pairs can be used in the packet header instead
of the original request string r. Assuming a 16KB data block and an average path hop
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count of 2, the average overhead imposed by the header and supplementary layer is about
250 bytes, which is less than 2% of the 16KB data block. Note that since the reward for
breaking the MobiCent’s encryption is relatively small, the one-time key size can be even
smaller in practice.
In order to evaluate the computation overhead, we measure the encryption and verifi-
cation time of ECC on the target implementation platform, a Soekris Net5501 box. Using
the OpenSSL library, measurements show that the average signing time is 15ms and the
average verification time is 20ms. The results show that these encryption schemes do not
impose significant overhead. In fact, researchers have shown that it is viable to use public-
key cryptography even on low power energy constraint platform using a 8-bit processor
(Atml ATmegal128L), in particular, if ECC is used [107]. Finally, note that these encryp-
tion and verification tasks do not have to be performed in real-time and can be performed
during the disconnected periods between contacts.
4.7 Related Work
In this section, we present related work of incentive scheme design in both Peer-to-Peer
(P2P) network and wireless network.
4.7.1 Incentive Techniques in P2P Network to Avoid Free-riding
It is widely agreed that some form of incentive is needed for P2P network to overcome
the free-riding problem, i.e., downloading files from the network without uploading any
in return. The three main incentive mechanisms being studied in literature are reputation,
barter (or Tit-for-Tat), and virtual currency.
In general, a P2P reputation scheme is coupled with a service differentiation scheme.
Contributing peers possess good reputations and receive good service from other peers.
For example, peers in the KaZaA file-sharing network [54] build up their reputation scores
by uploading files to others, and are rewarded with higher priority when downloading files
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from others.
Reputation-base approach is known to suffer from the Sybil attack [28] and the white-
washing attack [38]. Douceur [28] coins the name of Sybil attack. In a Sybil attack, a
single malicious peer generates multiple identities that collude with one another. Multiple
colluding peers may boost one another’s reputation scores by giving false praise, or punish
a target peer by giving false accusations. In a whitewashing attack, a peer defects in every
P2P transaction, but repeatedly leaves and rejoins the P2P system using newly created
identities, so that it will never suffer the negative consequences of a bad reputation. The
availability of cheap pseudonyms in P2P systems makes reputation systems vulnerable to
Sybil attacks and whitewashing attacks. Such attacks can also be easily launched in our
target environment.
BitTorrent file-sharing system adopted an incentive mechanism based on barter (or
Tit-for-Tat). By partitioning large files such as movies and software binaries into small
chunks, file-sharing using the BitTorrent protocol necessitates repeat interactions among
peers, allowing cooperation to flourish based on direct reciprocity rather than indirect
reciprocity. Yet, analysis has demonstrated that the BitTorrent protocol can still be ma-
nipulated by selfish peers in their favor, and fixes are suggested [62].
Tit-for-Tat does not suit our target environment, because in our environment, one peer
is likely to want more service from another peer than it could provide to that peer. In such
a situation, a credit-based system can better support the asymmetric transactions needed.
The use of virtual currency for incentives has also been proposed in several P2P
content distribution systems, e.g., KARMA [105] and Dandelion [98]. However, they are
designed for connected networks and will not work in a multi-hop setting with frequent
disconnections.
4.7.2 Security Protocol and Incentive Scheme in Wireless Networks
There are a number of incentive schemes for wireless networks. Incentive is needed
for wireless networks with user-contributed forwarding (e.g. mobile ad hoc networks)
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to overcome the free-riding problem, i.e., requesting others for forward its packets, but
avoiding to transmit others’ packets.
Incentive schemes based on micro-payment have been proposed in wireless networks.
FON [37], the largest community-based Wi-Fi ISP, has officially used its Wi-Fi Money to
encourage its member to cooperate. Every time a visitor (non-Fonero) uses a FON Wi-Fi
network, the owner can earn some “dinero” according to the time it connected. How-
ever, they only need to motivate their next-hop neighbor, whereas in MobiCent, multiple
helpers need to cooperate. Jakobsson et al. [50] discuss a micro-payment scheme to en-
courage collaboration in multi-hop cellular networks. Zhong et al. [118] propose Sprite, a
cheat-proof, credit-based system for stimulating cooperation among selfish nodes in mo-
bile ad hoc networks. Anderegg and Eidenbenz [4] and Zhong et al. [117] propose pricing
schemes based on use of VCG mechanism.
These schemes are not suitable for DTNs due to the following reasons. First, a com-
mon assumption adopted in these schemes is that an end-to-end connection between the
source and the destination is established before the data forwarding occurs. Second, the
reported schemes are mainly designed for single path forwarding.
Recently, several works address the incentive problem in delay-tolerant network. She-
vade et al. [97] propose the use of pair-wise Tit-for-Tat (TFT) as incentive mechanism for
DTNs. They enhance their TFT mechanism with generosity and contrition to address
the bootstrapping and link variation problem. However, their proposal is not suitable for
DTN routing scenarios where the delivery path cannot be pre-determined. In addition,
Tit-for-Tat is not suitable for our target environment, where there is a large population
of participants and a peer is likely to want much more service from another peer than it
could provide to that peer. Zhu et al. [119] propose a secure credit-based incentive scheme
for DTNs, with an emphasis on generation and verification of secure bundle. They do not
address the pricing issue. The link insertion (Sybil) attack is not considered in both works.
Newsome et al. [80] and Piro et al. [86] propose mechanisms to defend against the
Sybil attack in wireless networks. The basic idea is to test the resource of a node. Based
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on the observation that a given node only has limited resource (say, a single Wi-Fi radio),
a testing node can assign its neighbors into different channels, and randomly probes for a
neighbor in the channel specified. If a node mimics several Sybil nodes that are assigned
to different channels, as it can only appear in one channel in any given time, the prob-
ability that one of its Sybil nodes is caught is high. Jakobsson et al. [50] use statistic
techniques to detect the Sybil attack in multi-hop cellular networks over a long period of
time. However, it is much more difficult to detect the Sybil attack in DTN, where discon-
nection is the norm rather than exception and high user population dynamic is expected.
As a result, these techniques cannot be applied.
4.8 Summary
This chapter presents MobiCent, a credit-based incentive system for DTN and proves that
it is incentive compatible. MobiCent uses a Multiplicative Decreasing Reward (MDR)
algorithm to calculate payment and supports two types of clients, namely clients that
want to minimize cost or minimize delay. Simulation results show that MobiCent can
effectively foster cooperation among selfish nodes with bounded overhead.
Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Works
Mobile communication system is experiencing a fast and exciting evolution, driven by
both convergence of heterogeneous wireless networks and development of new cooper-
ative networking approaches. Great efforts have been devoted to build flexible architec-
ture capable of managing various network components as a whole, while new network
approaches are being proposed to harvest the potential performance improvement of co-
operation.
Users play a more central role in the stage. With increased intelligence, the new gen-
eration of wireless terminals not only can facilitate the radio resource allocation decision
by feeding back the measured channel state, but also can contribute directly to the re-
source provision process by forwarding data for each other. As users gain more control
over their devices, an intelligent and selfish user can adapt its behavior in order to bene-
fit more from the network, even when doing so may affect other users and the system’s
overall utility.
The design of new cooperative resource allocation and provision schemes should ex-
plore the cooperation possibility among heterogeneous wireless network components and
their users, while taking the selfish nature of users and their strategic interactions into con-
sideration. This thesis systematically investigates several fundamental design problems





As stated in Chapter 1, this thesis studies both the overlapping-coverage scenario and
intermittent-coverage scenario. For each scenario, we approach the problem from both
the system performance perspective and the incentive compatibility perspective.
Chapter 2 focuses on the overlapping-coverage scenario. It studies the coordinated
radio resource allocation problem for users that are simultaneously covered by multi-
ple overlapping heterogeneous wireless networks. We formulate the coordinated propor-
tional fairness (CPF) resource allocation criterion, based on which a globally fair and
efficient allocation decision can be easily computed. As CPF decision depends on the
input from users, a selfish user may manipulate its channel state report if doing so can in-
crease its gain from the network. To capture this phenomenon, we formulate the resource
allocation process as a multi-cell resource allocation game, which is associated with a
rule to calculate bandwidth allocation outcome based on the input from the MS players.
We prove that a multi-cell resource allocation game with CPF allocation is incentive com-
patible, which means a user’s dominant strategy is to report its channel state honestly. In
practice, the single-association setting, where a MS is only associated with one BS, is of-
ten desirable. We formulate the integral version of the CPF problem (Int-CPF) and show
that it is both computationally expensive and prone to user-manipulation. Alternatively,
we advocate the adoption of a Selfish Load Balancing (SLB) scheme, which always leads
to a Nash equilibrium, and often achieves performance near to CPF allocation. We use
simulation to evaluate the performance of proposed schemes. Our results show that the
proposed algorithms outperform popular heuristic approaches, by striking a good balance
between efficiency and fairness, while achieving load balancing among component BSs.
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 focus on the intermittent-coverage scenario. Chapter 3
presents MobTorrent, a cooperative, on-demand framework, which uses the ubiquitous
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low-bandwidth cellular network as a control channel while forwarding data through high-
bandwidth contacts in a DTN paradigm. We design the architecture of MobTorrent, and
analyze the problem of how to schedule the transmission over intermittent contacts, such
that the amount of data delivered is maximized and the delay is minimized. We use both
testbed and trace-driven simulation to evaluate the performance of MobTorrent.
Chapter 4 presents MobiCent, a credit-based incentive system for DTN. Following
the algorithmic mechanism design approach, we formulate the path revelation game, and
analyze the attack model. A message exchange protocol is carefully constructed to sup-
port the requirement of MobiCent, and two different algorithms are designed to cater to
client that wants to minimize either payment or data delivery delay. We prove that both
algorithms are incentive compatible, as rational nodes will not purposely waste any op-
portunistic transfer or cheat by creating non-existing contacts to increase their rewards.
To summarize, this thesis analyzes the opportunities and challenges that appear in the
forthcoming generation of mobile communication systems. We develop novel models and
techniques that can be used to exploit the new cooperative opportunities, and address the
challenges to foster cooperation.
5.2 Future Work
There are several possible extensions to the research work presented in this thesis.
• In our system model of overlapping cells, we assume that each cell has a fixed
amount of radio resource and they operate orthogonally. For future research, we
would like to incorporate the BS capacity adaptation and interference mitigation
into the consideration of the network-wide radio resource allocation.
• For the coordinated resource allocation problem in a convergent platform, we as-
sume that the ownership of radio cards is known by the network and cannot be mod-
ified by users. Though it is a valid assumption for existing networks, the increase
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of system openness will eventually enable users to game the system by manipu-
lating their radio card ownership as well. A resource allocation scheme should be
designed to address the arising challenges. In addition, it remains a research prob-
lem to design an efficient incentive-compatible scheme for the single-association
setting.
• When studying the incentive compatibility of the radio resource allocation prob-
lem, we focus on preventing users from cheating. As future mobile communication
system is an open environment where even the normal residential users can operate
as service provider, it is important to investigate the design of incentive-compatible
schemes that are robust to cheating of service providers as well.
• MobTorrent is designed for mobile users travelling with vehicles, and the perfor-
mance is evaluated under such settings. We are looking towards the possibility of
applying the idea of MobTorrent to human social networks. The mobility pattern
of human is shown to be predictable by Srinivasan et al. [100]. However, the un-
certainty tends to be greater, and the properties of the time-varying connectivity
graph are significantly different. In addition, the power consumption constraint of
hand-held devices is much more stringent. These factors raise new challenges that
require systematic investigations.
• It is worth investigating the design of intelligent applications and transport protocols
for mobile users, such that they can fully exploit the complementary characteristics
of two types of networks, one is highly available but with low bandwidth, and the
other is only available intermittently but provides high-bandwidth connections.
• As the delay-tolerant networking paradigm plays a more important role for mobile
Internet service provision, we are looking towards evaluating MobiCent’s perfor-
mance involving real users. Depending on the characteristics of applications and
user behaviors, further extensions of MobiCent can be expected.
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• The MobiCent pricing scheme provides a deterministic guarantee for incentive
compatibility regardless of the mobility pattern of users. If we relax this require-
ment, and aim at providing a stochastic guarantee about the user behavior instead,
better performance can possibly be achieved, in terms of both the frugality and the
efficiency. Further optimization can be expected by customizing the scheme ac-
cording to some specific characteristics of mobility patterns and routing protocols.
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